

MUSLIM AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERRORISM

by

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to underprivileged Muslim women around the world.

I pray you may achieve your educational goals

and

for you to gain the freedom to live your life in the best manner possible!

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In the end, to God alone belongs all praise and gratitude.

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ABSTRACT

MUSLIM AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
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This study examines the perceptions of Muslim Americans with regards to anti-terrorist policies and efforts in the U.S. with a specific emphasis on the U.S. led U.S. led Global War on Terrorism post-9/11. The perceived relationship or lack of between Islam and its support or condemnation of terrorism along with the perceptions of Muslim Americans with regards to the different components of the is assessed in this research. How Muslims feel towards the U.S. government's response to threats of terrorism and terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests is summarized along

with the effectiveness of the Global War on Terrorism. Data was collected in October/November of 2006 from Muslim Americans in the Dallas/Fort Worth area and processed using SPSS. The findings of this research focused on gender-related differences, if any. The study revealed that Muslim American males and females generally have similar views towards the Global War on Terrorism, security concerns, and the religion of Islam. The study also revealed that Muslim Americans feel they are the primary focus of the War on Terrorism and partially because of their religion. Policy implications were discussed as were recommendations for further research on a greater scale.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is only a matter of time before the next terrorist attack will strike again. Whether it will occur in the United States (herein referred to as U.S.) or in another country is secondary to the fact that the U.S. along with its interests are at serious risk to be the target of the next massive terrorist attack. Some people wonder why “they” hate “us” so much. “They” refers to terrorists, “Islamists,” “Middle Easterners,” Arabs, “Fundamentalists,” and “us” refers to Americans, the U.S., the West, liberal ideas, and western interests. The answer to this question is complex, therefore the public is left confused, fearful, and ignorant about the cycle of violence that occurs between terrorists and the targets or victims of terrorism.

1.1 Purpose

The American public has entrusted their government to unequivocally serve and protect them. This is especially the case during times of war or turmoil. When people feel they have been misrepresented or mistreated by their government or by policies created by their government, the resulting negative consequences are endless. The specific group of people this research focuses on is Muslim Americans. The perceptions and/or attitudes Muslim Americans have towards their government and policies created by their government are of utmost importance because they could serve

as influencing factors for minimizing tensions or hostilities among Muslims and non-Muslims.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) website, one hundred percent of their “Most Wanted Terrorists” and “Seeking Information – the War on Terrorism” is for individuals with names identified to be that of Muslims (www.fbi.gov). Similarly, the majority of groups and individuals determined to be affiliated or supporting terrorist activities are of Muslim origin. Islam is one of the fastest growing and misunderstood religions in the U.S. Whether the religion itself promotes terrorism or condones violence at any level as a means to an end is irrelevant compared to what Muslims perceive is in their religion. This perception should be of concern to any person whose job it is to protect the U.S. and its citizens. If such is the case where violence is or is not rooted in the religion, it is critical to find out if self-identified Muslims perceive that their religion supports terrorism and if they may feel certain terrorist acts are justified. It is for these reasons that one should be concerned and familiar with how Muslims feel towards terrorism, the U.S., and the U.S. led Global War on Terrorism (herein referred to as the GWOT for the rest of this study).

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of Muslim Americans with regards to anti-terrorist policies and efforts in the U.S. with a specific emphasis on the U.S. led GWOT post-9/11. The perceived relationship or lack thereof between Islam and its support or condemnation of terrorism will also be examined in this research. This study will also explore the perceptions of Muslim Americans with regards to the different components of the GWOT. How Muslims feel towards the U.S.

government's response to threats of terrorism and terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests will be summarized along with the perceived effectiveness of the GWOT. The U.S. might have had alternative motivations by initiating the GWOT.

The following questions will be answered throughout this research: What were the preceding incidents leading up to the War on Terrorism according to Muslims? Who are the perceived targets of the War on Terrorism and why are they the targets? What role does Islam play in the participation of terrorism according to Muslims? Do Muslims feel the War on Terrorism is effective and/or successful? Is it a fair and/or just war? Does the Muslim community feel that the War on Terrorism has generated more damage than benefit since September 11, 2001 (herein referred to as 9/11)? Have people's attitudes towards the U.S. changed towards a more negative feeling because of the War on Terrorism?

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon nor is it on the brink of extinction. On the contrary, the number of terrorist attacks has increased over the past decade despite radical changes made to counterterrorism efforts. According to the U.S. Department of State, there were 149 significant terrorist incidents in the forty years preceding the 2001 attacks of 9/11 (Office Historian, 2004, 1-11). When one compares these figures with the figures from the two short years preceding the 9/11 attacks, 95 incidents, one will notice the difference (Office Defense, 2004, 12-19). The increase in the number of incidents is particularly alarming because these incidents occurred despite the increased efforts and enormous amount of money being spent to combat terrorism in the latter years.

The Federal Unified National Defense Budget for the years 2003 and 2004 are \$1,890.6 billion and \$1,956.5 billion respectively (Office Defense, 2004, 21). The same budget for the few years preceding 9/11, 1998 and 1999, were \$1,652.6 billion and \$1,727.1 billion respectively (Office Defense, 1999, 18). This budget includes both national defense and international affairs. The differences may not appear significant, but one would presuppose that by increasing the defense budget by almost a hundred billion dollars per year, we would not see such an incremental rise of terrorist incidents.

The GWOT might not abolish terrorism entirely because the scope and range of terrorism has spread far beyond the capacity that any war can contain. Terrorism struck hard on the U.S. on 9/11. It was on this day that the U.S. witnessed one of the worst terrorist attacks in its history with over 3,000 people were killed and thousands more went missing or were injured (McCool, 2003, World Almanac & Book of Facts, 2002). In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government officially initiated the GWOT as both an emotional and political response. The imminent goals of the GWOT were to increase the protection of U.S. national security, assess/reduce the capabilities of terrorists and terrorist organizations, intensify the surveillance and authority of U.S. security/intelligence agencies, and deter future terrorists from striking at the U.S. again (Federal Bureau of Investigation, <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm>).

The GWOT encompasses a broad range of policies, efforts, organizations, and initiatives aimed at reducing real terrorist threats and minimizing the fear of terrorist attacks. The GWOT is a direct result of the U.S. government's response to public fear

and actual terrorist attacks that permanently altered the discourse and dynamics of terrorism in the 21st century. The GWOT crosses international boundaries and standardized rules of war. It is a timeless war without a clear and concise time frame in which the war will be over. In theory, the American public has little to no choice but to support the GWOT because the GWOT is one of the few options that may prevent or at least prolong the next terrorist attack (Aretgaxa, 2001). The actual time elapsing between terrorist threats or attacks is one of the indications of the effectiveness or successfulness of the GWOT. Other factors that will minimize the risks of being a target of the next terrorist attack will be discussed thoroughly in the latter part of this research.

There are a few factors one must take into consideration in order to understand the underlying causes of the increase of terrorist incidents and activities post 9/11. One must understand the approaches used in order to combat terrorism. A lot of attention is directed towards the U.S. regarding anti-terrorist legislation and activities because the U.S. leads the world in the efforts against terrorism monetarily through its defense budget and military capabilities, and through its own legislation and policies. The perception of how the U.S. is addressing the perceived threats of terrorism both on U.S. soil and abroad is crucial to the reality of the success or failures of this fight. More specifically, if the U.S.'s goal were to combat terrorism through war and military efforts, then one would logically suppose a similar response or reaction from prospective terrorists. If the goal of the U.S. included winning the hearts and minds of

the people on both an international and national level, the success rate of winning the GWOT may be slightly higher.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said in an interview a few days after the War on Terrorism began:

“Well, it’s whose hearts and minds do you want to win. Certainly, you’re not going to win the hearts and minds of the people who are committing these brutal acts and you’re not going to win the hearts and minds of the people that are cheering those acts. What you can do, however, is recognize that they represent a relatively small minority... (Secretary, 2004, 2).”

As will be discussed further in this research, it is this mentality that isolates the population of people that should have been the target of a hearts and minds campaign. This mentality is one of the many reasons the Bush Administration has not succeeded in their efforts to combat terrorism. The U.S. military and defense agencies are mostly ignorant about the real grievances or issues that Muslims and Arabs throughout the world have. This ignorance has created a dichotomy between the U.S. and the people the U.S. are trying to change (through democratization or liberalization).

One perspective of the GWOT is that the war is a “campaign by the U.S., enlisting the support of NATO members and other allies, with the stated goal of ending international terrorism by preventing those groups said to be terrorist in nature from posing a threat, and by putting an end to state sponsorship of terrorism. This campaign was launched by the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington,

D.C. by al-Qaeda. In addition to governmental actions in the War on Terrorism, several private organizations have played a role in gathering intelligence and supporting the effort” (Greenberg, 2001).

1.2 Outline

Despite President Bush’s official speeches and/or rhetoric stating the opposite, many people may feel the GWOT is a war against Muslims, Arabs, and the Middle East. The primary targets and most affected people of the GWOT have been these three groups. There seems to be some legitimacy to the feelings of discrimination by the U.S. among these groups. The U.S. does not have a good track record in the Muslim/Arab countries and among Muslims/Arabs living in the U.S. and Western countries. The unconditional support the U.S. has towards Israel, the indiscriminate use of force by the U.S. against areas where suspected terrorists are being harbored, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay/Iraq/Afghanistan/U.S., and other policies or acts created under the guise of the GWOT are all contributing factors to the negative opinions Muslims and/or Arabs may have towards the U.S.

The public’s reaction to 9/11 and their increased fear of terrorism following 9/11 paved the path for the U.S. government to take unprecedented measures in its response to terrorism. These measures include the creation of the Patriot Act and the initiation of two major military confrontations in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are also numerous “international instruments” that support efforts to address and combat terrorism on a global level. What goes into the decision making process and response

when a terrorist threat is revealed or a terrorist attack occurs? These are some of the issues which will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review in Chapter 2.

The literature review will begin by introducing the religion of Islam by describing the different aspects of the religion theologically and in actual practice. This section will include what it means to be a Muslim, the fundamental issues concerning Muslims, their goals and/or objectives, how international political and/or other conflicts affect Muslims living in the U.S., the experience of Muslims post-9/11 according to public media, the role of the mosque (religious center) and/or Imam (religious leader) in the lives of Muslims, and the position of women in Islam.

The second section of the literature review will be further broken down into the following subheadings: a brief history of international terrorism with a special emphasis placed on terrorism committed by self-identified Muslims, and/or in the name of Islam, and/or in predominantly Muslim countries. State sponsored terrorism will also be covered in this section. A brief history of terrorism in the U.S. will also be covered in this section. The literature review will also provide information about the September 11, 2001 attacks and the U.S. response to subsequent terrorist acts post-9/11. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and extremist Islamic ideologies will be covered in this section because they are allegedly the primary perpetrators of terrorist activities post 9/11. With the fifth anniversary of 9-11, the primary focus of the War on terrorism has and still is the group Al-Qaeda. What Al-Qaeda is and who are its members will be explained in Chapter 2.

The 9/11 attacks left many people shocked at the magnitude of loss in terms of human life and structural damage. Shortly after 9/11, academic literature and scholarly journals were flooded with articles, books, and reports about terrorism. Unfortunately, much of what was written about 9/11 excluded the attitudes and perceptions of the largest minority group being affected through the GWOT, individuals associating with the religion of Islam. The methodology used to reveal the attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge that Muslims have towards the GWOT and the U.S. is the topic for Chapter 3. The participants and subjects, materials used, data collection method and procedures will be described at length in the third section.

Chapter 4 will reveal the findings and analysis of the research. The author will utilize tables and figures in order to illustrate the reliability and confidence levels of the data collected. The author will subsequently provide a cohesive conclusion based on the findings of this research in chapter 5. Limitations of this study, policy implications, and suggestions for further research will also be included.

1.3 Definition of Terms

The following is a list of definitions that will be used for the purposes of this study only. The definitions are not intended to be comprehensive nor are they intended to exclude alternative explanations of the terms.

1.3.1 Islam

For the purposes of this study, Islam will be referred to as a religion and a way of life for Muslims. Islam will be further defined and described in the literature review. Muslims are referred to those individuals adhering to the principles and/or ascribing to

the teachings of the religion of Islam. American Muslims are people who consider themselves to belong to the Muslim faith and live in America. Visitors living in this country and those on temporary visas are included in this group of people. An Imam is a Muslim religious leader and a mosque is a designated place of worship for Muslims. More terms regarding this subtopic will be further defined in the next section.

1.3.2 Terrorism

Historically, definitions of the term terrorism have always been imprecise and extremely difficult to narrow down. There is currently no internationally accepted definition of terrorism (Crenshaw & Pimlott, 1997). For purposes of this research, the definition of the term terrorism will be used from the introduction of Patterns of Global Terrorism (Office Combating, 2001, Intro). The U.S. government has used this definition for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983: The term "terrorism" is referred to as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term *international terrorism* will be referred to as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term *terrorist group* will be referred to as any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

Scholars have gone so far as to define terrorism “attached as a label to those groups whose political objectives one finds objectionable” (Combs, 1997, 5). The definitions listed above have been selected because of the focus of this research. A broader definition which will not be used in this paper is detailed in Resolution 40/61 of

the General Assembly where it defines terrorism as all those acts “which endanger or take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms, and seriously impair the dignity of human beings” (United Nations GA, 25).

1.3.3 Global War on Terrorism

For the purposes of this paper, the GWOT is an umbrella term for any and all antiterrorist efforts initiated by the Bush Administration following the 9/11 attacks. One month after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush referred to the GWOT as a “war against all those who seek to export terror, and a war against those governments that support or shelter them” (Bush, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html>, ¶3). In actuality, the GWOT is a conglomeration of anti-terrorism measures and efforts by the U.S post-9/11. Some of these measures include diplomatic efforts, seizing the finances of terrorists, initiating military efforts against countries supporting terrorists, and creating new law enforcement agencies including the Department of Homeland Security and the Foreign Terrorist Task Force. President Bush vowed that the U.S. would make no difference between those who plan and carry out acts of terrorism and those who harbor them. These vows were the introduction and the backbone of the GWOT.

1.3.4 Prisoners

For purposes of this study, prisoners are individuals detained against their will by an opposing party during a war or conflict with or without charges. This will include people being held indefinitely because they allegedly pose national and international security threats. The documents and agreements related to the international regulations

and standards of prisoner treatment are referred to in the following conventions and treaties (Levie, 1979):

- 1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949
- 2) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949
- 3) Resolution XI, "Protection of Prisoners of War," adopted by the XXist International Conference of the Red Cross, 1969
- 4) Resolution 2444 (XXII), "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts," adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1969
- 5) Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977
- 6) Resolution 21, "Dissemination of Knowledge of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts," adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 1977

The definitions of human rights violations, abuses, and torture used in this paper are based on the documents outlined above. For the purpose of this paper, the definitions of these terms will be as follows: crimes against humanity are defined as consisting of various inhumane acts against "any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" (Holmes, 1989, 156). According to Holmes (1989), all mistreatment of civilians in the course of an aggressive war is a crime against humanity.

1.3.5 Other Terms

The terms attitude will be defined through the Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary as a "feeling or emotion toward a fact or state" (<http://www.m-w.com>, ¶4).

The term perception is defined as the "result of awareness or understanding"

(<http://www.m-w.com>, ¶3). The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 will be herein referred to as 9/11.

1.4 Conclusion

Although global terrorism existed far before 9/11, no single event in the 21st century caused as massive a response as the one to 9/11. The threat of terrorism in U.S. and in other countries is a real threat. Right after the 9/11 incidents, President George Bush declared that the attacks were not merely terrorist acts, but “acts of war” against the U.S. (Yoon, 2002). This research is relevant and important for policy makers because it will highlight the need for altering and redefining the U.S. approach to decrease terrorist incidents targeted at the U.S. There may be an underlying assumption that the current approach is not conducive to improving the relationships between Muslim Americans and the rest of the American public which includes the U.S. government. It is possible that when Muslim Americans have a positive perception towards the GWOT and other policies regarding anti-terrorism, there is a contributing factor towards achieving the primary goal of the GWOT, namely decreasing the threat of terrorism against the U.S. and its interests.

Guidelines and standards exist via International treaties and regulations regarding the treatment of individuals suspected of criminal activities, including terrorism. If one assumes that the GWOT falls under the general category of a war, then the U.S., in particular, must adhere to these agreements. There is also a wide body of literature expanding on and further defining what is and is not acceptable in terms of targeting individuals, regime change, collective punishment, etc. This research is

intended to contribute to that body of literature and provide alternative approaches that could be adopted by the U.S. in order to bridge the gap distancing Muslim Americans from the rest of the American public. Alternative approaches may allow for the anti-terrorism policies of the U.S. to be more productive and successful.

This research is also necessary for the purpose of ascertaining what attitudes and perceptions Muslims have towards the GWOT. Many people are guilty of generalizing or stereotyping against Muslims especially in the U.S. post-9/11 because the existing research is not fully comprehensive and/or reliable. A comprehensive assessment of the validity, effectiveness, and legitimacy the GWOT with regards to Muslim Americans will result in a better understanding of the problems or issues caused through policies in the GWOT.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Islam

The term *Islam* comes from the Arabic word-root *s-l-m*, which is generally interpreted to mean peace and submission. Specifically, Islam means submission to the will of God, and a Muslim is one who makes that submission (Wuthnow, 1998).

2.1.1 Historical Aspects

The origins of Islam date back to the first man on Earth according to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic belief: Adam. All human beings have descended from the earliest pair of Adam and Eve. Adam is believed to be the first Prophet or messenger of God on Earth. He conveyed the earliest and most fundamental message of Islam which the belief in one God that is above all else (Mawdudi, 1990). God has sent a Prophet to each of the nations on Earth. The last of the messengers or the Seal of the Prophets is Muhammad. “Peace and blessings of God be upon him” are mentioned each time the Muhammad’s name is read out of respect for his position (Mawdudi, 1990).

Muhammad was born in 570 Common Era (herein referred to as C.E.) in Mecca and belonged to the *Quraysh* tribe, which was active in the caravan trade. At the age of 25, he married a widowed business woman named Khadija. Critical of the lax moral standards and polytheistic practices of the inhabitants of Mecca, he began to lead a contemplative life in the desert. In a dramatic religious vision, the angel Gabriel

announced to Muhammad that he was to be a prophet. Encouraged by Khadija, he devoted himself to the reform of religion and society. Polytheism was to be abandoned. But leaders of the *Quraysh* generally rejected his teaching, and Muhammad gained only a small following and suffered persecution (Sarwar, 1994; Iyad, 1991; Al-Mubarakpuri, 2002; Emerick, 2002; Sakr, 2005).

Muhammad eventually fled Mecca because of this persecution. This relocation is referred to as the *Hijra* (meaning “emigration”). The *Hijra* of Muhammad from Mecca, where he was not honored, to Medina, where he was well received, occurred in 622 C.E. and marks the beginning of the Muslim era. After a number of military conflicts with Mecca, in 630 C.E. he marched on Mecca and conquered it. Muhammad died at Medina in 632 C.E. at the age of 63. Muhammad’s grave there has since been a place of pilgrimage (Sarwar, 1994; Iyad, 1991; Al-Mubarakpuri, 2002; Emerick, 2002).

Nearly the entire Arabian Peninsula had accepted Muhammad’s political and religious leadership by the time of his death (World Almanac, 2006). Islam spread quickly, stretching from Spain in the west to India in the east within a century after his death. Islam was spread to Africa and to Southeast Asia by trading Muslims, and today the greatest population of Muslims is concentrated in Indonesia. (Sarwar, 1994; Iyad, 1991; Al-Mubarakpuri, 2002; Emerick, 2002).

Muslims revere Muhammad as one of the greatest prophets of Allah which is the Arabic translation for God. Muslims consider Muhammad as the final prophet in the lineage of all other prophets. These include but are not limited to: Enoch, Noah, Hud, Salih, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Lot, Shuaib, Joseph, Job, Jonah, Moses, Ezekiel, Elisha, David, Solomon, Zechariah, John the Baptist, and Jesus (Ghazi, 1992; Ibn-

Katheer, 2001). The *Qur'an* (the divine scripture or Holy Book in Islam) states: Say: *"We believe in Allah and in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Isma`il, Isaac Jacob and the Tribes and in (Books) given to Moses, Jesus and the Prophets from their Lord; we make no distinction between one and another among them and to Allah do we bow our will (in Islam)"* (3:84).

The *Qur'an* makes clear that the religion of Muhammad is the last and most complete of the revealed religions. The *Qur'an* is a sacred book that cannot be *naskh* (abrogated), calls Muhammad the *khatam al-anbiya* ("Seal of the Prophets"), and refers to *Islam* as embracing all religious duties (Al-Mubarakpuri, 2002; Ibn-Katheer, 2001). The *Qur'an* states: *"And lo! I is an unassailable Scripture. Falsehood cannot come at it from before it or behind it"* (41:1-42). Muslims consider their Holy Book unique from the other religious scriptures because they refer to it in the original form and it has not changed nor do they believe it will ever change.

2.1.2 Original Sources

Valid and reliable sources of information and knowledge in *Islam* are not many. The first primary source of the Islamic faith is the *Qur'an*. According to *Islam*, Allah has promised to protect the original scripture and original text of the *Qur'an* so that it will not be modified in any form or matter. The *Qur'an* is regarded as the sacred eternal Word of God. The *hadith* or the sayings and traditions of Muhammad, is the second primary source of knowledge and information in the *Islamic* faith. A *hadith* (pl. *ahadith*) is composed of two parts: the *matn* (text) and the *isnad* (chain of reporters). A text may seem to be logical and reasonable but it needs an authentic *isnad* with reliable reporters to be acceptable (Ibn-Katheer, 2001; Al-Mubarakpuri, 2002). Al-Mubarak, a famous student

of Bukhari in *Islam*, said: "The *isnad* is part of the religion: if there was no *Isnad*, then everyone would say what they desired" (Khan, 2005, ¶ 7).

During the lifetime of Muhammad and after his death, his *Sahabah* (companions) used to refer to him directly, when quoting his sayings. The *Tabi'un* (successors) followed suit; some of them used to quote the Prophet through the Companions while others would omit the intermediate authority. The important reason for authenticating the *hadith* was the deliberate fabrication of *ahadith* by various sects which appeared amongst the Muslims, in order to support their views.

Ibn Sirin (d. 110), a Successor, said, "They would not ask about the *isnad*. But when the *fitnah* (trouble, turmoil, and esp. civil war) happened, they said: 'Name to us your men. So the narrations of the *Ahl al-Sunnah* (Adherents to the *Sunnah*) would be accepted, while those of the *Ahl al-Bid'ah* (Adherents to Innovation) would not be accepted'" (Compendium of Muslim texts, n.d., 4).

2.1.3 Beliefs in Islam

The religion of Islam is based upon the absolute monotheism of God. The belief system is established in a seven tier belief system which is the: 1) belief in one God; 2) belief in the existence of the angels of God; 3) belief in all the books of God including the Torah and the Gospel in its original forms; 4) belief in all the Messengers of God; 5) belief in Day of Judgment, life after death, and Heaven and Hell; and 6) belief in the Divine Decree or Predestination or supremacy of Divine Will – good and bad (Shakir, 2006; Sarwar, 1994; Al-Misri, 1994; Sabiq, 1985). Muslims also firmly believe they must "surrender to the will of *Allah*, the all-powerful, who determines humanity's fate"

(Sarwar, 1994) in order to be true to their religion. They also believe that good deeds will be rewarded at the Last Judgment in paradise, and evil deeds will be punished in hell.

2.1.4 Practical Aspects

This submission or act of Islam means living a life of faith and practice as defined in the Qur'an and participating in the life of the community of believers. The core of this Islamic life is usually said to be the Five Pillars of Islam. These five fundamental tenets of Islam are: 1) *Shahada*: the proclamation of faith - There is no God but Allah, and Mohammad is His Prophet, 2) *Salah*: praying five times a day, 3) *Zakah*: a tax that is devoted to providing financial help to the poor; almsgiving to the poor and the mosque (house of worship), 4) *Siyam*: fasting in the holy month of Ramadan, and 5) *Hajj*: pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a Muslim's lifetime, if one is physically and financially able to do so. The pilgrimage includes homage to the ancient shrine of the *Ka'aba*, the most sacred site in *Islam* (Dwairy, 2006, Wuthnow, 1998, Sarwar, 1994; Al-Misri, 1994, Sabiq, 1985). At a minimum, the true *Islamic fundamentalists* should adhere to and fulfill these five obligations.

Other responsibilities of Muslims are mandated in the *Shari'ah* or the Islamic rules and laws. The *Shari'ah* is based on the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* (actions of Muhammad according to the *hadith*) and it serves as a guideline for every aspect of individual and communal living. One's personal, familial, social, economic, and political life is guided by the *Shari'ah*. The *Shari'ah* is organized to create a balance between faith, prayer, and worship of God; and enjoyment and satisfaction of life on earth for Muslims (Al-Jabiri, 1992; Al-Misri, 1994).

2.1.5 Women in Islam

When one discusses the status of women in Islam, it is noteworthy to separate the cultural, social, and economic context from the Islamic viewpoints. Although predominantly Muslim societies and Muslim families vary in terms of the process and practice of traditionalism, religiosity, modernization, and Westernization (Joseph, 1999 as cited in Dwairy, 2006), the frame of reference is still male dominance (Dwairy, 2006). Taking in consideration the dangers of overgeneralization, many Muslim families and Muslim societies around the world operate in a very patriarchal and patrilineal manner while placing a very high value on family ties (Cainkar, 1996 as cited in Dwairy, 2006).

Woman according to the Qur'an is not blamed for Adam's first mistake. Both were jointly wrong in their disobedience to God, both repented, and both were forgiven. (Qur'an 2:36, 7:20 - 24). In one verse in fact (20:121), Adam specifically, was blamed. Men and women are equally accountable for their actions and faith according to Islam. "Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has faith, verily to him will We give a new life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward according to the their [*sic man and woman 's*] actions. (Qur'an 16:97, see also 4:124)".

When Islam came into the Saudi peninsula, the status of women was elevated because of Islam. Women were now allowed to own property, make decisions for themselves, and were considered as human beings and not as a commodity. Parents were forbidden to bury their daughters alive, which was a common pre-Islamic practice (Al-Sharikh, n.d.). Muslim women are still are oftentimes viewed as being oppressed because they are forced to be second class citizens to men, to get married against their will, to cover themselves and to stay at home, uneducated without any rights. On the contrary,

Muslim women are encouraged to become educated "Seeking knowledge is mandatory for every Muslim" (Abdul Baqi, 1955) including females. According to Islamic Law, women cannot be forced to marry anyone without their consent.

The religion of Islam does not encourage discriminating against women for any reason. Some of the cultural and social, but not Islamic practices towards women include: women forced into single or polygamous marriages; female genital mutilation (FGM) especially in some part of Africa and Egypt; women not having access to education or work; women not being allowed to drive (e.g. Saudi Arabia), and women subjected to the humiliation of "instant divorce" by their husbands (Maqsood, 2000). Again, these practices are cultural rather than mandated by Islam.

Other misconceptions and negative attitudes about women in Islam stem from the Islamic practices of men being allowed to marry up to four wives while women are allowed to marry only one man; a man's share of inheritance is bigger than a woman's; a man being allowed to marry a non-Muslim, a woman cannot; and women must wear *hijab* (veil). While these are legitimate practices according to Islamic Law (Al-Misri, 1994), each one has certain regulations, criteria, and explanations specifying the details.

Concerning the veiling of women in Islam, Muslims do not see the veil as an oppressive or backward practice. The veil is a symbol of modesty and it is prescribed to protect women from being judged or viewed simply by their external appearances. Thus, the only purpose of the veil in Islam is protection. The veil, unlike the veil of the Christian tradition, is not a sign of man's authority over woman nor is it a sign of woman's subjection to man. Also, unlike the veil in the Jewish tradition, the veil is not a sign of luxury and distinction of some noble married women. In Islam the veil is a sign of

modesty which safeguards the personal integrity of women. The *Qur'an* strongly emphasizes the protection of women's reputation and condemns men to be severely punished if they falsely accuse a woman of unchastity: The veil signified a woman's self-respect and modesty (Abdel Azim, 1990).

Muslim women who choose to cover themselves and use the veil are publicly noticed and oftentimes identified as Muslims because of their dress. In the U.S. and some European countries, Muslim women who wore the veil, were victims of physical and verbal assaults after the 9/11 attacks. The derogatory media representation of Muslims was blamed for most of these hate crimes (Ahmad, 2006). Reports of Muslim women being abused increased exponentially with many incidents not reported. One example of this abuse occurred in Swindon where white youths beat a young Muslim woman over the head with a baseball bat (Laville, 2001).

God is neither male nor female in Islam and does not favor one gender over the other. The *Qur'an* states: "...and the male is not like the female..." (3:36). Men and women are different in their composition, and in their responsibilities under Islam. However, both are bound by obligations to one another. Families are strongly encouraged under Islam and men and women are different in their responsibilities towards the families. Women are not obligated to work, whereas men are. The man must provide for the family, but the woman does not.

According to Islamic Law, a woman's right to her money, real estate, or other properties is fully acknowledged. This right undergoes no change whether she is single or married. She retains her full rights to buy, sell, mortgage or lease any or all of her properties. It is nowhere suggested in the Law that a woman is a minor simply because

she is a female. It is also noteworthy that such rights apply to her properties before marriage as well as to whatever she acquires thereafter. A famous *hadith* by Muhammad is directed towards men about their treatment of women: “And you are recommended to treat women with the best...and indeed you are recommended to treat women with kindness” (Sakr, 2005).

2.1.6 Divisions in Islam

In any religion there are people who stray away from the religion’s original teachings. Islam is no exception. There are two major sects in the Islamic faith. Although there are differences between the two, the core of the belief system is essentially the same. The dominant group in Islam follows the Sunni tradition which makes up more than 80% of the 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide. Sunnis base their religion in the *Qur’an* and *Sunnah* as understood by the primary scholars of the religion and the majority of the community (Council on American Muslim Relations, 2006, <http://www.cair-net.org>).

The second sect is called Shi’ism and the followers of this sect are concentrated primarily in Iran with segments of Shia’s in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Pakistan. There are approximately 120 million Shi’ite Muslims in the world. The split between Sunni’s and Shia’s was more of a political split than a religious one that occurred immediately following the death of Muhammad. Shi’ites followed Ali, the closest relative of Muhammad, as Muhammad's successor. Sunni’s called for any subsequent leadership to be supported by the people and by other members who carried positions of power in the community. Sunni’s followed Muhammad’s cousin, Abu Bakr, as a successor to Muhammad instead of Ali (Tabatabai, 2004).

Other sects of Islam include Sufism, Ahmediyya (which includes Qadiani and Lahore), Ismaili, and the Nation of Islam. These sects exist because of differences and disagreements on the Sunnah rather than disagreements over the Qur'an. Islam inherently condemns dividing the religion into sects in three different places in the Quran (6:159, 30:32, and 42:14). Although it is beneficial to know simply that these different sects of Islam exist, most of the literature will refer to Sunni Islam during this research.

2.1.7 Islam in America

The history of Islam in America dates back to the late 1100's. Whether through new discovery, the slave trade, immigration, or conversions, Islam was a present in the early American history. Table 2.1 outlines some of the significant events of the history of Islam in America. The references for these events are listed in Appendix B. Some of the events may be missing due to missing records or lack of adequate documentation. Although the history of Islam in America is noteworthy to mention, the Muslim community in America in the year 2007 is very diverse and spread out around the country. The demographics of Muslims in American and the role of the Mosque or Muslim religious center will also be discussed in the subsequent sections in this chapter.

Table 2.1: A brief timeline of important events in the history of Islam in America

1178	A Chinese document know as the Sung Document records the voyage of Muslim sailors to a land know as Mu-Lan-Pi (America). Mention of this document is contained in the publication, the Khotan Amiers, 1933.
1310	Abu Bakari (Abu Bakar), a Muslim king of the Malian Empire, spearheads a series of sea voyages to the New World.
1312	African Muslims (Mandinga) arrive in the Gulf of Mexico for exploration of the American interior using the Mississippi River as their access route. These Muslim explorers were from Mali and other parts of West Africa.
1530	African slaves arrive in America. More than 30 percent of the 10 million slaves were Muslim. They became the backbone of the American economy.

Table 2.1 – continued.

1539	Estevanico of Azamor, a Muslim from Morocco, becomes the first of three Americans to cross the continent. At least two states owe their beginnings to this Muslim, Arizona and New Mexico.
1790	Moors from Spain are reported living in South Carolina and Florida.
1807	Yarrow Mamout, an African Muslim slave, is set free in Washington DC, and later becomes one of the first shareholders of the second chartered bank in America, the Columbia Bank. Yarrow may have lived to be more than 128 years old, the oldest person in American history.
1828	Abdulrahman Ibrahim Ibn Sori, a former prince from and now a slave on a Georgia plantation, is freed by the order of Sec. of State Henry Clay and President John Adams.
1839	Sayyid Sa'id, ruler of Oman, orders his ship The Sultana to set sail for America on a trade mission. The Sultana touched port in New York, April 30
1856	The United States cavalry hire a Muslim by the name of Hajji Ali to experiment with raising camels in Arizona.
1870	The Reverend Norman, a Methodist missionary, converts to Islam.
1889	Edward W. Blyden, noted scholar and social activist, traveled throughout the eastern and southern parts of the United States, proclaiming Islam.
1893	Muslim immigrants from the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, etc. arrive in North America. They are mainly Turks, Kurds, Albanians, and Arabs.
1915	Albanian Muslims build a Masjid in Maine and establish an Islamic association. By 1919, they had established another Masjid in Connecticut. There was one of the first associations for Muslims in the United States.
1920	The Red Crescent, a Muslim charity modeled after the International Red Cross, is established in Detroit.
1926	Polish-speaking Tatars build a mosque in Brooklyn, NY.
1930	African American Muslims establish the First Muslim Mosque in Pittsburgh, PA.
1933	The Nation of Islam (NOI), one of the most significant organizations in American Muslim history, is founded. Two of the most famous African Americans, Muhammad Ali, and Al Hajj Malik al-Shabazz (Malcolm X), were early adherents of this movement. Both later embraced the true Islam along with many others.
1952	Muslims in the Armed Services sue the federal government to be allowed to identify themselves as Muslims. Until then, Islam was not recognized as a legitimate religion.
1955	The State Street Masjid in New York City is established by Sheikh Dawood Ahmed Faisal. It is still in use today and represents a special point in the development of the American Muslim community.

Table 2.1 – continued.

1962	The Dar-ul-Islam movement, an important group among the African American Muslim community is born. Until its disappearance in 1982-1983, it made a serious impact upon the development and practice of traditional Islam in America.
1962	The newspaper Muhammad Speaks is launched. It later becomes the largest minority weekly publication in the country and reached 800,000 readers.
1963	The Muslim Students Association (MSA) is established as an organization to aid foreign Muslims students attending schools in the U.S. In the 1970s, it gave birth to the Islamic Medical Association (IMA), The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), and the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE). It now has 100+ branches.
1968	The Hanafi Movement is founded by Hamas Abdul Khaalis. The Hanafi Madh-hab Center was established in New York, but later moved to Washington DC. This movement had a membership of more than 1000 in the United States. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar a famous basketball player, is one of the Muslims who first came into contact with Islam through this movement.
1975	Elijah Muhammad, leader of the Nation of Islam, dies and is succeeded by his son Warith Deen Mohammed, who has been credited with moving the NOI toward the broader universal concepts of Islam.
1982	The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) is established in Plainfield, IN. ISNA is now an umbrella organization for many active Islamic groups seeking to further the cause of Islam in the United States.
1990	Muslims hold the first solidarity conference called "Muslims Against Apartheid." This was the first conference of its kind in support of Muslims for the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. 1991 Imam Siraj Wahhaj offers an invocation (opening prayer) to the United States House of Representatives. He was the first Muslim to do so.
1991	The Muslim Members of the Military (MMM) organization hold their first "Unity in Uniform" conference. The conference took place at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington DC. According to the United States Department of Defense, there are more than 5000 Muslims in uniform on active duty in the military.
1991	Charles Bilal, Kountze, TX becomes the nation's first mayor in an American city.
1992	Imam Warith Deen Mohammed gives the invocation in the Senate.
2000	A crescent symbolizing Islam stood along with the Christmas tree and the Hanukkah candelabra on the Ellipse in Washington, DC.
2001	The postal service issued a stamp for the Muslim feast of Eid-al-Fitr at the request of thousands of Muslim school children.

Source: See Appendix B.

Sylviane Dioufe's book, *Servants of Allah* (1998) are also replete with examples of slaves who prayed, fasted and avoided pork as early as 1733. But the organized practice of Islam through places of worship was never allowed by slave masters. According to Albanian immigrant elder Ismail Vehbi, in 1915, Albanian immigrants in Maine established a congregation to offer Muslim prayer services. This prayer group remained informal and disintegrated when its founders moved from the state (Nimer, 2002).

2.1.7.1 Demographics

There are an estimated 6.1 million Muslims in America and 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide. According to the World Christian database in the 2006 World Almanac, the figures for Muslims in America are quite lowered to approximately 4.7 million. Many people mistakenly assume 'Muslim' and 'Arab' are interchangeable. Many Arabs are Christian. There are two million Christian Arabs—mainly Orthodox and Roman Catholic—living the U.S.

The American Muslim Council (AMC) in coalition with the Council on America-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in Washington, DC states that American Muslims have the following origins: South Asian, 25%; Arabs, 23%; African Americans, 14-20%; Sub-Saharan African, 10%; Iranian, 10%; Turk, 10%; Other Asian, 5%; Balkan, 2%; and other, 5% (American Muslim Council, <http://www.amcnational.org/>) (Council on American Muslim Relations, <http://www.cair-net.org/>).

Table 2.2 divides the Muslim population in North America by their ethnic ancestry. Table 2.3 uses the estimates of immigrants from Muslim populated regions to

describe their average household income, their education, their citizenship, and their region.

Table 2.2: Muslim Population in North America*

Ethnic Ancestry	Estimated Muslim Population
South Asian	25%
Arab	23 %
African American	14 (to 20) %
Sub-Saharan African	10 %
Iranian	10 %
Turk	6 %
Other Asian	5 %
Balkan	2 %
Other**	5 %

Source: (Nimer, 2002).

*United States and Canada.

**Includes Anglo Americans, Latinos, Native Americans

Table 2.3: U.S. Immigrants from Muslim Populated Regions

Region/Country	American Muslims	U.S. citizen	Bachelor degree/ higher	Average household income
Arab World	29 %	80 %	33 %	\$47,000
South Asia	27 %	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Iran	13 %	44 %	49 %	\$50,000
Sub-Saharan Africa	12 %	65 %	33 %	\$31,000
Turkey	7 %	70 %	40 %	\$52,000
Other Asian countries	5 %	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Balkan	3 %	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.

Table 2.3 – continued.

Region/Country	American Muslims	U.S. citizen	Bachelor degree/ higher	Average household income
Albanian	n.d.	85 %	22 %	\$45,000
Gayana	2 %	53 %	15 %	\$40,000
Trinidad and Tobago	1 %	42 %	15 %	\$36,000
Other*	5 %	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.

Sources: (Nimer, 2002)

*Includes Anglo Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans.

One of the reasons Islam is considered one of the fastest growing religions in the U.S. is because of an increasing number Americans converting to Islam. The ethnicity of converts is varied although the greatest proportion is African-Americans, 64%; followed by White American, 27%; Hispanic, 6%, and other, 3% (Bagby, 2001).

2.1.7.2 Role of the Mosque

Once confined to the nation's biggest cities, mosques, Islamic houses of worship, are rapidly becoming a familiar site on main streets across the country. There are some 3,000 mosques in the U.S. Fueled by immigration and conversions, Islam is the fastest growing religion in America. It is also the fastest growing faith in the world (Nimer, 2002). Muslims gather for congregational worship on Fridays. Prayers and a sermon take place at the mosque, which is also a center for teaching of the Qur'an.

The oldest existing mosque community in North America is the Islamic Cultural Center in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. A group of Lebanese Sunni immigrants came together in 1925 to start a prayer group. They raised money and began constructing the actual facility in 1929, despite the Great Depression; the fully finished mosque opened to prayer in

1934. Later, the community built its current mosque structure and renamed the organization Islamic Center of Cedar Rapids. The original structure, nicknamed Mother Mosque, has been designated a historic landmark by the State of Iowa. Shia immigrants, also from Lebanon, in Dearborn, Michigan began forming congregations in 1949. In 1963 the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn opened for worshippers (Nimer, 2002).

Islamic centers are built and operated by local communities around the country to offer prayer, the second pillar of the Islamic faith. Islamic centers also offer varied activities, including civic and social services. Muslims who attend mosques come from all ethnic backgrounds known in this country (See Fig. 2.4). Any Muslim can take part in prayer at any mosque. Many mosques, however, tend to be dominated by ethnic clusters.

There are many different sizes and types of mosques in the United States. Mosques that have attendees who are predominantly Sunni or Shia are among the most common ones. Other mosques include Agha Khani, Qadiani, and other less populated sects of the religion. There is no central structure that ties all Islamic centers, but many of the Sunni mosques are affiliated with national and local Muslim organizations. Table 2.4 provides the ethnicity of Sunni Mosque attendees in the United States according to Bagby's (2001) research.

Table 2.4: Ethnic Breakdown of (Sunni) Mosques Attendees in the United States:

Ethnicity	%
South Asian	33
African American	30
Arab	25
Sub-Saharan African	3.4

Table 2.4 – continued.

Ethnicity	%
European (Balkan)	2.1
White American	1.6
Southeast Asian	1.3
Caribbean	1.2
Turkish	1.1
Iranian	0.7
Hispanic/Latino	0.6

Source: (Bagby, 2001).

“Mosque community dynamics often reflect the ethnic make up of congregations. Most Muslims gravitate to mosques frequented by members of their own ethnicity or national origin, especially among the recent immigrant population. As a result, in most mosques a majority of the participants come from a single ethnic background. But centers that draw members exclusively from one ethnic group represent only 10 percent of all U.S. mosques,” according to the Bagby report (2001).

Typically, mosques with attendees primarily of one ethnic group are located in all-African American neighborhoods, the evolution of which predated the various waves of Muslim immigration and conversion. Other patterns of ethnic distribution among the mosque communities exist including Indian-Pakistani, Arab (non-African), and Arab (African) ethnic groups. Although board members often come from the dominant ethnic group in a given center, this is not uniformly the case. The pluralism in the structure of mosque communities is manifest not only in the ethnic characteristics of individual

Islamic centers, but also in their leadership patterns and religious orientations (Council on American Muslim Relations, <http://www.cair-net.org/>).

Mosques generally welcome new participants. Because of the continuing immigration, conversion and mobility of people, the demographic composition of mosques continues to change. The constant need to absorb new members is naturally ripe with tension, as comers who do not belong to the dominant groups often feel marginalized in decisions about activities and use of the center's facilities. They may reduce their affiliation to participation in prayer services only. Sometimes dissatisfied members depart to form new centers. Such splits, resulting in the emergence of new mosques, are often viewed as an effective means of resolving irreconcilable differences. After all, the congregations are voluntary associations of individuals (Council on American Muslim Relations, <http://www.cair-net.org/>).

The contribution of Muslim women to Islamic centers is essential for the maintenance of mosque life. However, some Islamic centers are struggling with accommodating women activities. Also, in most mosques women are not represented adequately in decision making bodies. Mosques are hubs of activity for women, who take part in prayers and other educational and social functions. Women are teachers and directors of a variety of educational programs for children. They usually form auxiliary committees running programs for mosque participants in general. They teach children the value of volunteerism and supporting one's mosque through a variety of fundraising activities, including bake sales. Women committees organize speaking events and discussion groups focusing on women's concerns (T.H. Said, personal communication, September 29, 2006).

Great disparities between males and females do exist with regards to the services both groups receive at mosques. A few centers with adequate facilities have offered women fitness programs. Others have arranged for all-female sports events, including swimming, in outside facilities. In such centers, the social profile of women is a factor in their involvement. Centers with female participants who are highly educated and hold income producing jobs are more likely to offer substantial services to women than mosques struggling to maintain the minimum requirements of establishing religious life. The less affluent or organized congregations, which are usually very small in size or lack adequate funding, barely offer prayer space to women if at all (T.H. Said, personal communication, September 29, 2006).

Regardless of affluence, many mosque communities struggle with offering equal accommodations, including the quality of the prayer space. In mosques that create separate quarters for women, such quarters may be neglected when they are not frequently used by women. Typically, in such centers women are not represented on boards and *shura* councils. Although women are in theory allowed to serve on these leadership forums, this actually occurs in only a small number of the centers (T.H. Said, personal communication, September 29, 2006).

2.1.8 Politics in Islam

U.S. foreign policy and political Islam are deeply intertwined (Esposito, 2006). The unfavorable social and economic conditions that frequently invite Western scholars to interpret Islamic radicalism in their light fail to account for the anti-Western agenda of political Islam. The destruction of the Islamic Caliphate almost 100 years ago, the inception of European Colonialism in Muslim and Arab lands, and Western endorsement

of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine seem to better explain political Islam's grudge against the West than the simplistic socioeconomic argument (Haddad & Kashan, 2002).

The American Muslim Task (AMT) Force on Civil Rights and Elections 2004, an official umbrella organization of many American Muslim Organizations, has made Civil rights its main concern, they call their strategy "Civil Rights Plus." A Zogby poll commissioned by the Georgetown University and released on October 19, 2004, indicated that 81 per cent American Muslims supported AMT Election Plan including its "Civil Rights Plus" agenda which emphasizes 1) civil and human rights for all, 2) domestic issues of public good and general welfare, and 3) global peace with justice, prevention of war, and U.S. relations with the Muslim world (Zogby, 2004).

According to AMC, 46% of American Muslims are registered Democrats, 15.8% are Republicans, and 26.4% are independents. Contrary to popular belief, in the 2000 elections 70% of all U.S. Muslims voted for George Bush. The remainder of the vote was split between Albert Gore and Ralph Nader according to Neveen Salem, director of communications and media at the AMC. Political party affiliations are divided by 46% of American Muslims registered as Democrats, 15.8% Republicans, and 26.4% independents (American Muslim Council, <http://www.amcnational.org/>). According to the U.S. Department of State survey in 2002, seventy percent of American Muslims "strongly agree" they should participate in American institutions and in the American political process (*Muslim Life in America*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslimlife>).

2.1.9 Human Rights in Islam

Human rights in *Islam* have been granted by Allah; they have not been granted by any king or by any legislative assembly. Neither a government nor any person of power has the right or authority to make any amendment or change these rights according to Muslims. No one has the right to abrogate them or withdraw them. Human rights are not conferred on paper for the sake of show and exhibition and denied in actual life when the show is over. They are also not like philosophical concepts which have no sanctions behind them (Asad, 1985; Hathout, 1998). The rights granted by the kings or the legislative assemblies can be withdrawn in the same manner in which they are conferred. The same is the case with the rights accepted and recognized by the dictators. Dictators can confer them when they please and withdraw them when they wish. Dictators can also openly violate them when they like.

Among the specified protected populations in Islam are women, children, the elderly, and the sick. It is not permissible to oppress women, children, old people, the sick or the wounded. Women's honor and chastity are to be respected under all circumstances (Al-Disuqi, 1999). The hungry person must be fed, the naked clothed and the wounded or diseased treated medically irrespective of whether they belong to the Islamic community or are from among its enemies (Asad, 1985). In a purely *Islamic* environment or *Islamic* State, there are fundamental rights and freedoms that are protected. These rights are similar to the U.S. Constitution's assumed preservation and protection of civil rights and freedoms for its people.

The rights according to *Islam* are:

1. The security of life and property: Muhammad said, "Your lives and properties are forbidden to one another till you meet your Lord on the Day of Resurrection." He also said this about the *dhimmis* (the non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state): "One who kills a man under covenant (i.e., *dhimmi*) will not even smell the fragrance of Paradise."
2. The protection of honor: The *Qur'an* states: "You who believe, do not let one (set of) people make fun of another set." "Do not defame one another." "Do not insult by using nicknames." "Do not backbite or speak ill of one another."(49:11-12).
3. The preservation of the sanctity and security of private life: Again, the *Qur'an* specifies: "Do not spy on one another" (49:12) and "Do not enter any houses unless you are sure of their occupant's consent" (24:27).
4. The security of personal freedom: Islam has laid down the principle that no citizen can be imprisoned unless his guilt has been proven in an open court. To arrest a man only on the basis of suspicion and to throw him into a prison without proper court proceedings and without providing him a reasonable opportunity to produce his defense is not permissible in Islam.
5. The right to protest against tyranny: Among the rights that Islam has conferred on human beings is the right to protest against government's tyranny. Referring to it the *Qur'an* says: "*God does not love evil talk in public unless it is by someone who has been injured thereby.*" (4:148).
6. The freedom of expression: Islam gives the right of freedom of thought and expression to all citizens of the Islamic state on the condition that it should be

- used for the propagation of virtue and truth and not for spreading evil and wickedness. Under no circumstances would Islam allow evil and wickedness to be propagated. It also does not give anybody the right to use abusive or offensive language in the name of criticism. It was the practice of the Muslims to enquire from their Prophet whether on a certain matter a divine injunction had been revealed to him. If he said that he had received no divine injunction, the Muslims freely expressed their opinion on the matter.
7. The freedom of association: Islam has also given people the right to freedom of association and formation of parties or organizations. This right is also subject to certain rules guiding Muslims.
 8. The freedom of conscience and conviction: Islam has laid down the injunction: "*There should be no coercion in the matter of faith*" (Qur'an, 2:256). On the contrary, totalitarian societies totally deprive the individuals of their freedom. Indeed, this undue exaltation of the state authority curiously enough postulates a sort of servitude, of slavishness on the part of man. At one time slavery meant total control of man over man - now that type of slavery has been legally abolished but in its place totalitarian societies impose a similar sort of control over individuals.
 9. The protection of religious sentiments: Along with the freedom of conviction and freedom of conscience, Islam has given the right to the individual that his religious sentiments will be given due respect and nothing will be said or done which may encroach upon his right.

10. Protection from arbitrary imprisonment: Islam recognizes the right of the individual not to be arrested or imprisoned for the offenses of others. The *Qur'an* states: "*No bearer of burdens shall be made to bear the burden of another*" (35:18).
11. The right to basic necessities of life: In Islam, the needs of the poor are recognized with help and assistance provided. Again, the *Qur'an* states: "*And in their wealth there is acknowledged right for the needy and the destitute*" (51:19).
12. Equality before the law: Islam gives its citizens the right to absolute and complete equality in the eyes of the law.
13. Rulers are not above the law: A woman belonging to a high and noble family was arrested in connection with theft. The case was brought to the Prophet, and it was recommended that she might be spared the punishment of theft. The Prophet replied: "The nations that lived before you were destroyed by God because they punished the common man for their offenses and let their dignitaries go unpunished for their crimes; I swear by Him Who holds my life in His hand that even if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, had committed this crime, I would have amputated her hand."
14. The right to participate in the affairs of state: "*And their business is (conducted) through consultation among themselves*" (*Qur'an*, 42:38). The *Shura* or the legislative assembly has no other meaning except that the executive head of the government and the members of the assembly should be elected by free and independent choice of the people.

(*Human rights in Islam*, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/humanrelations/humanrights/>)

Lastly, it is to be made clear that Islam tries to achieve the above mentioned human rights and many others not only by providing certain legal safeguards but mainly by inviting mankind to transcend the lower level of animal life and go beyond the mere ties fostered by the kinship of blood, racial superiority, linguistic arrogance, and economic privileges. It invites mankind to move on to a plane of existence where, by reason of his inner excellence, man can realize the ideal of the Brotherhood of man.

2.1.10 Jihad in Islam

Jihad is misleadingly translated as “Holy War” by the media and by many Westerners (Euben, 2002). The origination of this terminology stems from the Arabic root word J-H-D, which means "strive" or “struggle.” Other words derived from this root include "effort," "labor," and "fatigue." Misinterpretations or misrepresentations of *jihad* oftentimes link Islam with extremism, radicalism, and/or violence. According to the majority of scholars in Islam, *jihad* is an inner struggle for one’s own soul against the flesh and for righteousness against the forbidden (Herbst, 2003). This explanation of *jihad* compels Muslims to strive for justice and compassion (Herbst, 2003).

Karen Armstrong (2001) defined *jihad* as, “the effort or struggle to achieve [a just] world where you learn to lay aside your own selfishness and recognize the needs of the poor, elderly, and sick...” *Jihad* is essentially an effort to practice religion in the face of oppression and persecution. *Islam* does not tolerate unprovoked aggression from its own side. Muslims are commanded in the *Qur'an* not to begin hostilities, embark on any act of aggression, violate the rights of others, or harm the innocent. Even hurting or destroying animals or trees is forbidden. War is waged only to defend the religious community against oppression and persecution, because "*persecution is worse than*

slaughter" and "let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression" (Qur'an, 2:190-193). Therefore, if non-Muslims are peaceful or indifferent to Islam, there is no justified reason to declare war on them. Islam condemns violence except in self-defense (Armstrong, 2001).

The Qur'an states: "The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah: for (Allah) loves not those who do wrong...The blame is only against those who oppress men and insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land, defying right and justice: for such there will be a grievous penalty. And whoever is patient and forgiving, these most surely are actions due to courage" (42: 40-43)

The protection of all houses of worship is also mandated in *Islam*. Finally, the *Qur'an* also says, "*Let there be no compulsion in religion*" (2:256). Forcing someone at the point of a sword to choose death or *Islam* is an idea that is foreign to *Islam* in spirit and in historical practice. In *Islam*, there is absolutely no concept of waging a "holy war" to "spread the faith" and compel people to embrace *Islam*; that would be an unholy war and the people's forced conversions would not be sincere.

The effects of the term *jihad* deeply rooted in the English lexicon and the frequent distortion of its meaning has resulted in the annihilation of the literal meaning and original intentions of the concept of *jihad*. This distortion is not entirely irrelevant. *Jihad* also refers to fighting of a war in the name of justice or *Islam* to deter an aggressor, for self-defense, and/or to establish justice and freedom to practice religion.

Jihad is a familiar yet terrifying representation of the transition from a concept in religion to literal actions; in some instances death (Euben, 2002). Within the Islamic

framework, war and violence is prima facie prohibited or at the very least extremely disliked. Imam Burusawi explains: “You should know that reciprocating vile deeds with vile deeds would only increase vileness. Therefore, the command to patiently endure abusive transgressions minimizes those things that bring harm to the worldly realm” (2001).

Who are Muslims permitted to fight and when? *“And fight in the cause of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits. And kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from where they drove you out, and persecution is severer than slaughter, and do not fight with them at the Sacred Mosque (in Makkah) until they fight with you in it, but if they do fight you, then slay them; such is the reward of the unbelievers. But if they desist, then surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. And fight with them until there is no persecution, and religion should be only for Allah, but if they desist, then there should be no hostility except against the oppressors” (Qur’an, 2:190-192).*

Similarly, the *Qur’an* has commanded Muslims to remain mindful of God in order to minimize those things that jeopardize the life hereafter (3:186). It is interesting to note that this verse was historically revealed after the migration to Medina. Therefore, it was a pronouncement of state policy for the nascent Muslim polity. The strategic benefits of this policy would be realized years later in the bloodless conquest of Mecca.

Human blood is sacred in Islam and should not be spilled without justification. And if anyone violates this sanctity of human blood by killing a soul without justification, the *Qur’an* equates it to the killing of entire mankind. *“...Whosoever slays a soul not to retaliate for a soul slain, nor for corruption done in the land, should be as if*

he had slain mankind altogether" (5:32). Some Muslims justify shedding blood of who they consider "legitimate enemies of Islam" (Herbst, 2003). These enemies are Israel for its treatment towards the Palestinian people and the U.S. at the very least, for alleged crimes against Islam and Muslim. For example, if Muslims felt the attacks of 9/11 were justified, they probably also felt that the U.S. was a legitimate enemy of Islam and therefore the U.S. met the criteria for being a target of Jihad.

2.1.11 Prisoners and Torture in Islam

The religion of *Islam* forbids using torture against detainees and prisoners regardless of the circumstances. There are *hadiths* that "obligate Muslims to relieve prisoners of any discomfort, treat them for their ills and allow them to complete wills for their property, which the state must communicate to its enemy. Furthermore, the mother cannot be separated from child, nor can near relatives be split apart" (Thomas, 2005, 11). Other "obligatory laws govern the rights of prisoners. They are to be treated fairly...and fed at no charge and provided with the needed care. As evidenced by the treatment of Taliban POWs at the prison in Mazar-i-Sharif, Muslim commanders have proven willing to free prisoners when they could no longer provide for their basic care. They enjoy the right to be protected from the heat and cold and to be provided with clothes, as was the habit of the Prophet Mohammad" (Thomas, 2005, 11).

Another *hadith* encourages Muslim soldiers to respect the dignity of prisoners as well as their status. It reads ...pay respect to the dignity of a nation who is brought low. Most jurists also concur that labor cannot be extracted from a POW. There is no historical evidence to contradict this maxim, nor is forced labor mentioned in scripture. A prisoner can be disciplined, however, for violating administrative rules. The

punishment for a breach of discipline must be commensurate with the violation. Finally, an escaped POW, who is later recaptured, cannot be tried for escaping or for his actions after reaching *Dar al-Harb* or literally meaning the abode of war. He may be punished for the minor offense of breaching parole, unless he is killed in the process of fleeing, while still in *Dar al-Islam* or the abode of Islam. In all cases of POW treatment, the Islamic state bears the burden of responsibility for the well-being of prisoners due to the collective nature of *jihad* (Thomas, 2005).

Outside the realm of Islam, in the past and even today, prisoners were abused and tortured with both modern and medieval prisoners restraining, disabling, and repressive technologies by their Non-Muslim capturers. Examples of this are leg shackles, thumbs cuffs, suspension equipment, blunt trauma-inducing drugs, electroshock weapons, electrically heated hot tables, whips, iron-chained filled rubber hoses, cat-'o-nine-tails, clubs, canes, specially designed torture devices and interrogation rooms using white noise, and stroboscopic or UV light (Forrest ed., 1996; Peters,1986). The training of interrogators include conflict training used to “capture, stress, and soften up” dissidents. Intense interrogation techniques bordered on torture when scientific approaches based on psychopharmacology or sensory deprivation were incorporated.

The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No, III) specifies that “persons captured during an international armed conflict be entitled to the protection of the treaty even if their identity as prisoners of war ... is in doubt... until a competent tribunal has determined their status.” This Convention also governs penal and disciplinary sanctions that may be imposed on POWs. Article 102 and 106 require states that the sentence imposed on a prisoner of war is valid

“only if it were pronounced by the same courts in accordance with the same procedure as for the members of the detaining power’s armed forces and due process provisions of the treaty were observed ... the detaining power must provide the same rights of appeal to prisoners as to members of its own armed forces” (Levie, 1979).

Torture in itself is a form of cruelty. Again, the religion of Islam forbids the use of torture against detainees and prisoners. According to Arnault (2003), what transpires when torture takes place is a victim “undergoing the destruction (or near destruction) of meaning, the loss of dignity and agency, and the fragmentation and disintegration of subjectivity.” The tortured undergoes not only physical pain, but mental and psychological trauma as well. The damages are magnified when torture is done on detained prisoners. It is in this environment where regulation and oversight are at a minimum and the public is not well informed of what is taking place on the inside of the prison. Amnesty International created the Campaign for the Abolition of Torture in December 1972. Their aim was to stop what they perceived was the widespread use of torture by governments and political groups. Their mission was three-fold: document, denounce, and mobilize. Amnesty International’s heightened exposure of torture led to a heightened interest among governments, professional, and the public (Forrest ed., 1996; Prokosch, 1996). This ultimately led to United Nations General Assembly’s passing of Resolution 3059 which generally calls on all governments to become partiesto prohibit torture. Amnesty originally called on the General Assembly to “outlaw immediately the torture of prisoners throughout the world” (Forrest, , Prokosch, 1996).

The General Assembly subsequently adopted Resolution 3452; the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,

or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (Declaration Against Torture) in December of 1975. In an Annex to this Declaration, states were denied the right to claim exceptional circumstances, even war, as justification for torture in Article 3. Article 5 specifies that states shall train police and other public officials not to employ torture and Article 6 says that states should systematically review methods of interrogation. Thirty-five nations signed the 'Helenski Agreement' that bound the signatories in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms to act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Peters, 1986).

2.2 Terrorism

2.2.1 International Terrorism

This next section will cover terrorism in the context of the religion of Islam, a brief description of Al-Qaeda, terrorist incidents that involve self-identified Muslims, and some information on state-sponsored terrorism. Terrorist acts that cross international borders or have actors that cross borders to commit those acts are included in the definition of international terrorism for the purposes of this study.

2.2.1.1 Terrorism in Islam

Terrorists groups have used religion to promote their causes which have created an environment where Muslims are becoming more and more associated as being terrorists or supporting terrorist activities. The religion of Islam became incorrectly defined as a religion that supports terrorism and even rewards terrorists acting in the name of Islam. Overlooked were the terrorists who were associated with the Christian or Jewish faiths or of other religious associations. Terrorists intending to gain support for

their actions may abuse, distort or misinterpret any religions in order to justify actions that would not otherwise be allowed under fundamental religious teachings. Although the religion of Islam does not promote evil, those who are spreading terror and advocating violence may claim that it does.

Terrorism as an act of violence has been committed by people from all religious and political backgrounds. Terrorists who happened to be Christians (e.g. in Bosnia, England, Ireland, Germany, Spain...etc.) and those who happened to be Jewish (e.g. in Israel, Palestine and Lebanon) used their religious beliefs to claim legitimacy for the violence and terrorism they commit. Thousands of women, children and men, young and old have been killed in attempts to achieve or hold on to special interests whether political, social or religious (Herbst, 2003).

Since the religion of Islam is not well understood by the West and by western media outlets, the word terrorists and terrorism have become essentially synonymous with the religion. This mistake has been common not only by the media, but by academics and scholars who publish on this topic as well. Several groups who called themselves Jews, Christians or Muslims, have used terrorism to force their agenda, issues or beliefs. None of these groups represent the true religion of the Jews or the Christians just as these terrorists do not represent the true religion of Islam. Attacks on civilians the world over by terrorists is the kind of strife that cannot be justified by any religion and is strongly condemned in all religions, including Islam.

Some of the terrorist groups which massacre innocent people consider themselves martyrs. Those who kill the innocent people in the name of their religion or the name of God, who think of themselves as martyrs are not justified in their religion. Such acts are

actually strongly condemned by God in the the verses of the *Qur'an* (5:32, 42:40-43, 41:34-35). The religion condemns violence specifically on civilians, women, children, and infrastructure.

2.2.1.2 Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is one of the most widely mentioned terrorist groups among the academic literature regarding active terrorist activities in the post 9/11 era both in the U.S. and internationally. The literal translation of the Arabic word *Al-Qaeda* is “The Base.” The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, Islamic Salvation Foundation, and the Osama Bin Laden Network are aliases in which *al-Qaeda* is referred. *Al-Qaeda* is believed to be responsible for both the World Trade Center Bombings in 1993 and 2001. Bin Laden has also been charged with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Kushner, 2003). The core of *al-Qaeda's* original members were *mujahideen* (or fighters in the cause of religion) fighting against the Soviets during the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Herbst, 2003).

Al-Qaeda has proved itself to the international community to be “remarkably nimble, flexible, and an [sic] adaptive entity” (Bergen, 2005 as cited in Greenberg [Ed.], 2005). Recruitment efforts of *al-Qaeda* should be applauded because of *al-Qaeda's* success in recruiting unsuspecting individuals who are educated and well assimilated into western cultures. Members like Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrrah from the 9/11 attacks were prime candidates (Coll, 2005 as cited in Greenberg [Ed.], 2005). It is through these recruitment techniques *al-Qaeda* has been successful at planning and carrying out attacks without prior red flags being shot off. Examples include the January 2003 ricin plot in

London and the April 2003 attacks in Tel Aviv (Bergen, 2005 as cited in Greenberg [Ed.], 2005).

Prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda targeted American embassies, not economic targets. They refocused their attention on economic targets because they realized this is the best way to attack the West. On one of his videotapes released, Bin Laden claimed for every one dollar al-Qaeda spent, it cost the U.S. \$1 million in damages. (Bergen, 2005 as cited in Greenberg [Ed.], 2005). The economic targets of al-Qaeda should not be confused with the motivations or incentives of the al-Qaeda operatives or terrorists. It is near impossible to persuade a group of young men in their twenties to fly passenger planes into buildings because of money. The motivations are greater than pure economic benefits. Members of al-Qaeda and surprisingly lay-people not affiliated with al-Qaeda or any terrorist organization support the cause (at least in theory) of Bin Laden.

Some of the grievances Bin Laden emphasizes are: the U.S. unconditional support for Israel in its occupation against the Palestinian people; the U.S. military presence in Muslim lands with specific attention focused on Islam's two holy cities in Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia; and the U.S. involvement in Iraq pre- and post- 9/11 during the times of economic sanctions and during the present occupation. Bin Laden also urges his supporters to recognize and confront corrupt Arab and Muslim leaders who are placed in power by and are puppets of Washington, D.C. (Fouda, 2005 as cited in Greenberg [Ed.], 2005). Another issue that arises not only by al-Qaeda and Bin Laden but by many other organizations and people is the general opposition to vast globalization. This globalization has created a crisis for many people who are looking for some sense of belonging and a clearer identity. By joining and participating in terrorist

groups (religious, political and other), individuals get a greater sense of self-satisfaction, purpose, and identity than before (Stern 2005, as cited in Greenberg [Ed.], 2005).

Al-Qaeda has dispersed and multiplied. There is no longer a single entity carrying the banner of al-Qaeda. Pockets of al-Qaeda appear in small suburbs in Germany, cafes in Tel Aviv, in the streets of Baghdad, and in the mountains of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda continues to remain active in the U.S., United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and many other countries. Festering conflicts throughout the world involving Muslims fuel recognition and support for al-Qaeda and similar organizations. These unsettling conflicts include, but are not limited to the Arab/Israeli issue, the Iraqi War, military activities in Afghanistan, and the tensions in Chechnya and Kashmir. The handling of detainees and prisoners during the GWOT by the U.S. (which will be detailed at length in section 2.2.3.3) has also caused major setback for the U.S.

2.2.1.3 Terrorist organizations involving Muslims

The U.S. leads the world in identifying and labeling organizations as supporting and sponsoring terrorism. There are numerous groups of suspected terrorists such that one could assume they are “Islamic groups” or Muslim run groups on the basis of the group’s names. The following is a list of terrorist organizations identified by the U.S. Department of State in 2005:

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (according to the Country Reports on Terrorism
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism April 28, 2006

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Ansar al-Sunna (AS)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG)
HAMAS
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
Hizballah
Islamic Jihad Group (IJU)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)
Al-Jihad (AJ)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Qaida (AQ)
Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

Secondary Group of Concern (according to Country Reports on Terrorism

Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism April 28, 2006)

Al-Badr Mujahedin (al-Badr)
Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh
Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)
Islamic Great East Raiders-Front (IBDA-C)
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)
Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh (JBM)
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)

Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
(RSRSBCM)
Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Turkish Hizballah

2.2.1.4 State Sponsored Terrorism

State sponsored terrorism refers to the “use by a state or surrogate groups to do its terrorist bidding, can, like terrorism itself, be applied in service to political agendas in opposition to the accused state rather than as a result of objective analysis of state’s policies” (Abunimah, 2006).

“State sponsorship of terrorism, also known as ‘state supported’ terrorism, when governments provide supplies, training, and other forms of support to non-state terrorist organizations. One of the most valuable types of this support is the provision of safe haven or physical basing for the terrorists' organization. Another crucial service a state sponsor can provide is false documentation, not only for personal identification (passports, internal identification documents), but also for financial transactions and weapons purchases. Other means of support are access to training facilities and expertise not readily available to groups without extensive resources. Finally, the extension of diplomatic protections and services, such as immunity from extradition, diplomatic passports, use of embassies and other protected grounds, and diplomatic pouches to transport weapons or explosives have been significant to some groups”

(State Sponsored Terrorism, 2006, ¶8).

“An example of state sponsorship is the Syrian government's support of Hamas and Hizballah in Lebanon. Syrian resources and protection enable the huge training establishments in the Bek'aa Valley. On a smaller, more discreet scale, the East German Stasi provided support and safe-haven to members of the Red Army Faction (RAF or Baader Meinhof Gang) and neo-fascist groups that operated in West Germany. Wanted members of the RAF were found resident in East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989” (State Sponsored Terrorism, ¶9). The U.S. Department of State has

designated six countries that sponsor terrorism, four of which are populated predominantly by Muslims. Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are among these countries according to their 2006 report (*Country reports on terrorism*, 2006).

2.2.2 Domestic Terrorism

Terrorism in the U.S. has been documented as early as 1901 when President McKinley was shot in Buffalo, New York by anarchist, Leon Czolgosz (Mattox, 2004). The year 1963 was remembered for the Ku Klux Klan bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama. In 1972, the U.S. Pentagon was bombed. In 1975, La Guardia airport in NY was bombed, Grand Central Station in 1976 and the Statue of Liberty was bombed in 1980. Eco-terrorism prevailed in the 1980's with the International Evan Meacham Eco-Terrorist Conspiracies in Arizona. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 is the same year two people were killed outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Another government building, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma was bombed in 1995 (Kushner, 2003).

Acts of Terrorism on U.S. soil were few and far between when compared to the frequency of terrorist activities over one hundred years later. In the past decade alone, some notable acts of terrorism included the explosion at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta in 1996, a semi-automatic fatal assault on foreign tourists at the Empire State Building in 1997, the bombing of an abortion clinic in an Atlanta suburb in 1997 also, and then the infamous September 11, 2001 attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Mattox, 2004).

Besides the incidents of terrorism on U.S. soil, U.S. interests, including military interests and U.S. embassies, have been the targets of many terrorist attacks. In the past ten years alone, there have been several incidents of terrorism where Americans have been killed or injured as a result of the attack. In June of 1996, the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia were bombed. A fuel truck blew up 19 American soldiers outside the United States military compound. More than 500 people were wounded. In August of 1998, the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were bombed.

These terrorist attacks happened almost simultaneously and left more than 5,000 people injured. Around 224 people were killed when the buildings that they were working in collapsed during the explosions. In October of 2000, the USS Cole was docked in Aden, Yemen for refueling. A small craft pulled alongside the ship and two terrorists set off a bomb. The two terrorists were killed and so were 17 U.S. Navy seamen when the explosion blew a 20 by 40 foot hole in the side of the ship (Washington Post, 2005).

2.2.3 September 11, 2001 Terrorist attacks

The United States of America faced one of the most horrific tragedies in its history on September 11, 2001 with the consecutive terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Approximately 3,000 people were killed (Braun, 2002). It is generally accepted that the U.S. has been permanently impacted by these attacks. The government made radical modifications to the way they addressed threats post 9/11. For example, over four billion dollars was allocated to enhance the capabilities of

FEMA's first-responders alone. Airport security increased including the hiring of over 70,000 federal security guards (Picquet & Shanty, 2003). More air marshals were covertly flying on commercial airlines not to mention tighter restrictions at check-in. "No-fly zones" were established around major targets in the U.S. as well as a military aircraft patrolling the Washington D.C. and New York areas. The combination of fear and insecurity resulted in the mobilization of people taking proactive actions to protect themselves. People bought survival kits, stopped traveling as much, and became much more suspicious of others around them. They lobbied their representatives to take stronger measures to ensure the safety of the areas they lived in and they also rallied around the President as their leader in this time of crisis. The public's awareness and perception of terrorism increased and changed forever. With all these changes taking place in the U.S., the American public was put on a permanent heightened alert. People's daily mood depended on what threat level color was flying that day.

2.3 U.S. Anti-Terrorism Efforts

2.3.1 Global War on Terrorism

War, inflicts both physical and psychological violence. War, by its very nature causes casualties on both sides of the conflict. The soldiers partaking in the war are obliged to follow their commanders unconditionally with few exceptions. The soldiers' prime focus is that they are fighting an enemy; "they can try to kill me and I can try to kill them. But it is wrong to cut the throats of their wounded or to shoot them down when they are trying to surrender...war is still a moral world...in the midst of hell" (Walzer, 1992).

The current war against terrorism is unfolding as “the indeterminate, the unfolding, and the continual eruption of the new” (Grosz, 1999 – cite from Aretxaga article) is arrested. The GWOT is characterized by the temporality of waiting: waiting for the next attack, waiting for the spread of a virus, waiting for the killing of terrorists, waiting... “as a prolonged moment of suspension and anxiety, of terror transformed into a spectacle, of terror that is also a thrill, of terror that focuses and binds into a new sense of patriotic affect” (Aretaxa, 2001). He goes on to state that for most people, the sense of waiting characterizes the situation of being in war. Participants have a role to play in this waiting war by being vigilant, attentive, and ready to discover undefined suspicious movement that might reveal a terrorist plot. This war has been represented by the media as an evitable war which exists more or less to “save the world” (Aretxaga, 2001).

The GWOT in theory is a war between the “forces of good and the forces of evil.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on CNN, “The important thing is we know who the bad guys are” even if we don’t know anything else. Some people argue that this world war against terrorism is imbalanced because the grand military might of the U.S. and its allies is being deployed against little known Islamist organizations with clear motivations to track single actors, primarily Osama Bin Laden and his counterparts. Bin Laden has been active since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1998, it is said that Bin Laden issued a *fatwa* (religious verdict) that condoned the killing of American civilians. When the attacks of 9/11 took place and Bin Laden was the primary suspect for masterminding the attack (Richardson, 2003).

The President and other top U.S. officials have publicly denied the GWOT is a war against Islam and Muslims. They have also attempted to enlist as much support in the Muslim world as possible in order to build stronger alliances in that population. Alliances are formed on two principles: countries loosely support the U.S. GWOT out of fear of alienating the leaders and the populations in the respective homelands; and because of the financial and/or political profit a country may gain by allying itself with the U.S. (Aretxaga, 2001). Although the leaders of predominantly Muslim countries may support the U.S. anti-terrorist efforts, the attitude of the general population is not always consistent with their leaders.

Anti-Americanism is greater in countries receiving foreign aid from the U.S. because the public feels victimized twice, once for the grievances other Muslims have and second because the U.S. is supporting regimes that are oppressing its people. For example, Jordan and Egypt are “allies” with the U.S. even though those countries population does not have favorable views towards the U.S. (Nematt, 2005). Four of the U.S. closest allies in the GWOT located in the Muslim world were polled; Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Osama Bin Laden had a higher approval rating in those countries than President Bush had in the U.S. In Pakistan, Bin Laden’s favorability rating was sixty-five percent with Jordan and Morocco’s rating fifty-five and forty-five respectively. Bin Laden had a fifty percent approval rating in Saudi Arabia (Greenberg Ed., 2005).

The U.S. has approached the GWOT in a semi-conventional matter as it has in previous war-time situations. The U.S. has followed a well-known routine of American

military intervention: display of military might, surgical air strikes, and covert operations. This war has produced a passionate nationalistic unity and intense feelings of patriotism for the American public. The enemy of the GWOT has engaged in more of a guerilla type warfare. This war triggers “outrage and sympathy among the discontented population of the Middle East ... and it justifies (and even demands) the suicide attacks on the American population” (Aretxaga, 2001). The GWOT has “outlived both its usefulness and its relevance...war...more akin to a global insurgency or a global counter-insurgency” (Greenberg Ed., 2005).

Under the general premises of the GWOT, one of the objectives was to improve the quality of intelligence. The F.B.I. for example attempted to take specific measures to achieve this goal by focusing on ways to make better use of their intelligence: (requirements management; planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation of collected information; analysis and production; and dissemination)

(FBI, September 14, 2006 from <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm>).

2.3.2 Office of Homeland Security

The Office of Homeland Security (herein referred to as OHS) was created by an executive order issued by President Bush in response to the 9/11 attacks. The OHS was created in response to the lack of cooperation, coordination, and sharing of information among the various intelligence organizations in the U.S. and was created only nine months after the attack without resistance from either house in Congress. The

consolidation of the different intelligence agencies at the federal level was aimed at improving the detection capabilities and interpretation of intelligence.

The OHS was created in order to bring about a closer connection between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and other government agencies. Members of the OHS council include the directors of the FBI, CIA, and FEMA; the attorney general; the secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Treasury; and any other officers of the executive branch designated by the President. This council is responsible for developing and implementing homeland security policies with the primary purposes of: detecting, preparing, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks within the U.S. (Kushner, 2003).

One year after the OHS was created, President Bush restructured the OHS operations by providing staff, standard procedures, and budget authority over anti-terrorism spending. The budget is organized into four divisions: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information Analysis, and Infrastructure Protection (Kushner, 2003). The total budget planned for the OHS in the year 2007 is \$42.7 billion. In 2006, the budget was \$41.1 billion, \$40.2 billion in 2005, \$36.2 billion in 2004, \$31.2 billion in 2003, and \$19.5 billion in 2002 (<http://www.dhs.gov/about/budget/>).

The President also made Senate confirmation over the OHS director mandatory and made the OHS accountable to Congress. This was in response to direct criticism by

members of the OHS that the OHS was ineffective because it lacked clear leadership and accountability (Kushner, 2003). On October 13, 2006, President Bush made these comments: "The most solemn responsibility of the federal government is to protect the American people... We've more than tripled spending on homeland security. We've created a federal Department of Homeland Security with a single mission: to protect the American people... We have a responsibility to protect the homeland and we're meeting that responsibility."

2.3.3 The Patriot Act: Modifications to policies and laws

The Patriot Act is a lengthy piece of legislation (342 pages long) (USA PATRIOT ACT. Pub. L. 107 -56, 115 Stat. 272, 2001) and was passed hastily through Congress without much debate or testimony. The normal committee and hearing processes were suspended for this bill which caused controversy among many citizens. Judicial Review places the judiciary in charge of reviewing statutes and determining whether or not they are in violation of the Constitution (Zalman, 2002). The Patriot Act subsequently took power away from the judiciary branch and gave it to the executive branch of government thus allowing the President to bypass the courts, avoiding judiciary checks and balances.

Although many elements of the Patriot Act are directed towards non-citizens relating to terrorist activities or groups, money laundering, and threatening national security, there are parts that directly impact U.S. citizens as well (Markham & Abu Rabi, 2002). In the Texas Forum of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Vijay Sekhon (2003) asserts that the U.S. has not socially evolved to include equal and respected civil

liberties for all its citizens. Criminal Procedure in the U.S. is defined as the methods that the government uses to detect, investigate, apprehend, prosecute, convict, and punish all criminals. The Supreme Court's interpretations of the law are a dominant source of authority in criminal procedure. This authority sets a minimal federal standard that states must abide known as *parallel rights* that must be guaranteed to all citizens (Samaha, 1999).

Furthermore, due process is a part of our criminal justice system that protects individuals and guarantees them their rights in the Constitution. Due process is also part of the international criminal justice standards. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14) is one of the most important documents concerning due process rights. The U.S. signed this treaty in September 1992. The Department of Defense is currently under Presidential orders set in place by President Clinton in 1998 to observe the provisions of this treaty. Article 14 guarantees a fair and public hearing, guaranteeing nondiscrimination during the legal process for all persons. The hearings must be brought before a "competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law," the presumption of innocence, due process rights, and the right to appeal a conviction to a "higher tribunal according to law" (Mundis, 2002).

The U.S. criminal justice system presupposes a fair and speedy trial, no cruel and unusual punishment, and full compliance with the federally mandated rights. A monumental shift in procedure occurred in the United States after 9/11. What was previously a consistent shift between the due process and crime control models (Packer, 1968) had now become a permanent instability between the two. The criminal justice

system was and is in a continuous struggle of what its major agendum is: to aggressively pursue and punish criminals or to ensure the rights and civil liberties of the accused are protected. The struggle is ongoing today except the dynamics of it have changed. The debate between Packer's crime control versus due process (1968) has gained greater notoriety than ever before in U.S. history because of the magnitude of changes attached to 9/11.

It may be argued that the pendulum has permanently shifted in favor of crime control since 9/11. Diminishing terrorism, aggressively pursuing criminals, and punishing those who threaten the U.S. and its interests are of greater concern as opposed to carefully protecting rights of accused criminals. As a result of 9/11 and through the Patriot Act, crime control has become the primary social and political agenda of the United States. During the days following the 9/11 attacks, the radical antiterrorism legislation that was passed through both the House and the Senate was met with minimal discussion or resistance.

The Patriot Act was created only a month after the attacks and it allegedly violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments of the Constitution. It took authority away from the Courts and placed it in the hands of law enforcement officials and intelligence gathering agencies. "The Patriot Act altered the existing balance between law enforcement capabilities and the expectations of American citizens" (Toobin, 2002). It eliminated many of the checks and balances that were set in place to make sure individual's rights were protected.

Living in the U.S. post 9/11 means different things for different people. Prior to 9/11, Americans seemed willing to give up some of their civil liberties for the sake of security when the issue of domestic security was at stake. During relatively peaceful times and when a war was not being waged with the U.S., there was greater concern and considerations given to individual rights and liberties. Since 9/11, the crime control (Packer, 1968) mode has taken hold in relation to suspected terrorist activities. Prior to this, it was only during brief intermittent periods of war or unique threats against the U.S. when the Government so eagerly pursued crime control with regards to foreign peoples.

Ironically, there are sections in the Patriot Act that categorically imply a bias against Muslims, Arabs, and Americans from South Asia. For example, Section 102.b calls for the protection of civil rights and liberties specifically for these three groups of people which undermines the argument that the Patriot Act is focused unilaterally on crime control. Specific attention given to due process rights as it is written in Section 102 (USA PATRIOT ACT. Pub. L. 107 -56, 115 Stat. 272, 2001) implies there is some equilibrium between crime control and due process (Packer, 1968) internally in the Patriot Act. This implication is only evident in the writing of the Patriot Act since it is these specific groups that have been primarily targeted. The fact that Congress recognized this discrimination during the aftermath of 9/11 is monumental because it was taking preemptive measures to appear fair in the application of the Patriot Act. While Congress is urging the public not to be stereotypical or make generalizations

against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians; this is next to impossible according to what history has shown with the Russians and Japanese respectively during periods of war.

The ways in which civil liberties and civil rights were violated prior to September 11 does not compare to the magnitude of violations caused by the Patriot Act. Although some sections of the Patriot Act will expire unless Congress renews them, the Patriot Act has done permanent damage to the very structure that the U.S. was founded upon. Reiterating a common theme, the protections and provisions the Framers of the Constitution set up on behalf of the American people were tossed out the window and replaced by a system lacking checks and balances among the branches of government. This lack of regulation, if allowed to continue, will negatively effect citizens and non-citizens living in the United States.

The tragedy of September 11th introduced fears and worries among the American public that they never had before. People's lives changed forever when terrorist acts were brought on United States soil. The Patriot Act was drafted under the auspices of restricting terrorists and limiting their terrorist activities. It was established with the intention to extinguish threats to Americans and to national security. Some argue that the Patriot Act has permanently scarred the essence of criminal procedure in the U.S. and U.S. criminal justice system. Even if the Act were to be completely abolished today, the damage already caused by the Patriot Act cannot be amended.

There are many advocates to the Patriot Act as there are opponents. Alan Dershowitz, a leading terrorism expert, mentioned just one argument in favor of the Patriot Act that may be worth mentioning in the context of crime control. He states that

before 9/11, terrorists may have been coerced into providing information or turning in other members of the terrorist organization because they were either improperly prepared or trained on what to do if they were detained. For the most part, persons detained in the post 9/11 era who are involved in terrorist activities have larger motivations and are linked to a wider network of people. They are now less likely to provide intelligence and betray their brethren even at the risk of abuse and torture. The prisoners' dilemma of trading information for leniency is not so applicable to "apocalyptic terrorism engaged in by groups like Al-Qaeda" (Dershowitz, 2002, p. 100). Dershowitz believes that the U.S. has finally sent a message to terrorist groups by engaging swiftly and massively in military responses following the 9/11 attacks. The message to other terrorists that target Americans is that they will "pay a heavy price for their actions" (Dershowitz, 2002, p. 103).

In 2003, the Patriot Act got a face lift by Attorney General John Ashcroft's Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (aka "Patriot II"). This revised edition would provide, among other things, for "the unprecedented revocation of the citizenship of anyone deemed to have provided material support to an organization the government has labeled as terrorist" (Stephens, 2004). The eighty-four page document was passed with over a hundred new provisions "upgrading" the original Patriot Act.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to specify the means in which the data utilized in this study was obtained, studied, and analyzed. A quantitative approach was used because it is the most common research and it is also used when conducting exploratory research. The quantitative research techniques are part of primary research where variables are established, counted, and statistical models constructed in an attempt to explain what is observed.

The primary survey research used in this section is exploratory data analysis (Van Wagenen, 1991). Data to analyze Muslim's perceptions and knowledge of the GWOT was obtained through a self-administered 21-item survey. The surveying instrument was approved by the Internal Review Board (IRB) prior to beginning any research. Permission was granted from the Islamic Association of Tarrant County (IATC) including two of its board members to implement the survey and distribute it to the membership lists.

The sampling frame was the IATC mailing distribution lists (herein referred to as MDL). The survey was mailed to all of the members on IATC's MDL and collected during September and October of 2006. The data collected is representative of the larger Muslim population in the U.S. The aggregate characteristics of the sample

population “closely approximate those same aggregate characteristics in the population” (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998). Since the MDLs of Islamic Centers is all-inclusive of Muslims living near and/or participating in the Islamic Center, the population of IATC serves as a fair representation for the larger Muslim population.

3.1 Sampling

The participants were chosen through a non-probability convenience sampling method in which every unit had an equal probability of being selected. The sample population was representative of the whole population because all members listed on the population list were selected. The number of subjects selected in the research group was 400. As a general rule, the larger the sample size, the smaller the sampling error tends to be (StatSoft, n.d. as cited in Turner, 2005). The return rate was lower than 25% or 75 replies. The sample size in this study meets the criteria necessary to obtain statistical significance according Keppel, Saufley, & Tokunaga (2000). Their minimum objective is a sample of 69 in order to achieve a “70% chance of obtaining a statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level” (Turner, 2005). According to Cohen’s description of a “Power Sample,” a minimum size sample of 45 is required to reach a power level of 0.80 for a treatment study (Cohen, 1988).

3.2 Subject Pool

The subject pool of this study consisted of individuals and families listed on the Islamic Association of Tarrant County (IATC) MDL. The participants were all either paid or unpaid members of IATC. The IATC’s MDL was selected because the units were readily available to the researcher. Participants were requested not to make

any identifying marks on the data collection tool or the return envelopes. No other information about the participants was collected besides the demographic questions.

The Islamic Center of Tarrant County is located in Fort Worth, Texas in Tarrant County. “Fort Worth is the 19th largest city in the U.S.” (Santiago, 2005). According to the U.S. Department of Commerce Census Bureau (1990) as cited from the American Muslim Council (<http://www.amcnational.org>), the state of Texas includes approximately three percent of all Muslims living in the U.S. IATC is one of the largest and most populated Islamic Centers in the Fort Worth area. The community members and attendees of IATC are from various socio-economic levels with different degrees of formal education. Their backgrounds also vary from being: 1) immigrants; 2) American converts/reverts to Islam; and 3) those born to the first two groups as Muslims. IATC’s high estimate of the Friday prayer service averages 300 attendees. The bi-annual holiday programs or *Eid* celebrations attract around 1,200 attendees.

An internally renowned *Hafiz* (one who has memorized the *Qur’an* in its entirety) is employed by the IATC to lead the daily prayers. There is a full-time Sunday school with programs for adults and children taught by Islamic scholars and professionals. IATC participates in interfaith gatherings; *dawah* (outreach for new *Muslims* or those interested in *Islam*); services to help the community such as marriage ceremonies, funerals, counseling, peer advising, youth groups, summer camps, religious celebrations, political mobilization, and other sessions to raise Muslim awareness on different issues; and community services to help the poor and needy.

3.3 Design of Research

The method of delivering the surveys to the participants was through the U.S. Postal Service First Class Mail. The investigator created the instrument along with a cover letter introducing the investigator and the purpose of the research. The letter emphasized the researcher's respect for the privacy of the participants such that any information gathered would be kept completely confidential and anonymous at all times. The letter also instructed the participants not to leave any identifying information on any of the forms. The cover letter, the survey instrument, and a pre-addressed return envelope were placed into another stamped envelope to be mailed. The investigator submitted the 400 units to the administrative secretary at the IATC to mail according to their own mailing lists. The investigator did not have access to the mailing lists or any identifying information of the recipients.

A self-administered survey was selected in order to ensure the privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity of the target population and their respective responses. The method of delivery through mail was selected because mail surveys are among the "least expensive ... and ... they allow the respondent to answer at their leisure, rather than at the often inconvenient moment they are contacted for a phone or personal interview. For this reason, they are not considered as intrusive as other kinds of interviews" (Survey, 2005).

The appearance of the measuring instrument and the layout was spread out and uncluttered. Items/questions were clear and unambiguous. Double-barreled questions were avoided. The questions and statements were short, to the point, and relevant to the

research. Negative and biased items were avoided in the formulation of the questions. On the respondent's section, boxes were adequately spaced apart and the respondents were asked to check a box or circle a response. The instrument was sent on nice, clean, and professional stationary.

The participants were given approximately 3 weeks to return the surveys. There were 3 announcements made at the IATC reminding people to complete and return the surveys either at the drop-in boxes or via mail. Although one of the disadvantages of mailing the surveys is the time in which the participants respond, the investigator did not consider this a problem because the anticipated return quota was met during the predetermined time frame of three weeks.

3.4 Survey Instrument

The researcher pre-tested the survey instrument in order to minimize the possible errors of ambiguous questions, questions that the respondents could not answer. The researchers requested the pre-test respondents to complete the questionnaire rather than ask them to proofread it or look for errors. Once the pre-testing was complete, the survey was sent as a self-administered survey by mail that not only collected information about the sample's perceptions of the GWOT, but also their knowledge of the GWOT and demographic information. The goal of the survey was to determine the perceptions and knowledge that Muslims have about the GWOT, if any. Besides the demographic questions, all of the questions were formatted to ask about the GWOT, security concerns, or issues effecting Muslims.

The surveying instrument was six pages long with the first page consisting of consent information and instructions on how to return the completed surveys. Participants were instructed to complete the survey only if they were 18 years or older at the time of the survey. They were advised to stop completing the survey at any time if they felt uncomfortable or wished not to complete it without any consequences or repercussions. This first page was also a disclaimer and instructions page. The instructions stated how the participants should return the surveys by either: 1) mailing the completed survey to the principal investigator in the enclosed pre-addressed return envelopes or 2) dropping the surveys off in especially marked boxes outside the main prayer halls at the Islamic Association of Tarrant County. A box was placed outside the men's and women's areas for return of the surveys.

The rest of the surveying instrument consisted of twenty-one questions with each question having one or more subparts. The first two questions were demographic questions that served as qualifiers that established the religious affiliation of each of the participants. Since one of the primary objectives was to survey the perceptions and knowledge of Muslims, the purpose of this question was to establish that all the participants were Muslim at some level. Therefore, the first two questions established whether the participant was Muslim and if so, to what extent the participant adheres to the teachings of Islam.

After the qualifying questions, the instrument was broken into three main subheadings: 1) perceptions of the war on terrorism, 2) knowledge of the war on terrorism, and 3) general demographic information. Questions 3-8 were perception

questions, 9-13 were knowledge questions, and 14-21 were demographic questions. The perception and knowledge questions were structured using 5-point Likert Scales, rating scales, and agreement scales. Statements and questions were used to offer better flexibility in the design of the items (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998).

The questions on the instrument were mostly closed ended. The only open-ended questions were in the final choice of the multiple choice questions where participants were given the option to fill in the “other” blank if no other choice applied. Closed-ended questions are more popular in survey research because of their uniformity and are easily processed compared to open-ended. Again, “closed ended questions were used for their greater uniformity than that of open ended questions and for the ease of processing them using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS)” (Babbie, 2001 as cited in Morris II, 2002). The response categories in the closed-ended questions were exhaustive for the purpose of including all possible responses that might be expected (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998). The answer categories were also mutually exclusive in most of the questions. The respondent was instructed to select one or more of the answer choices in those questions where the answers were not mutually exclusive.

In the third section, the questions were formed with a multi-factored analysis of variance and a different number of choices distributed in each question. The participants’ level of education, age, sex, ethnicity, number of years living in the U.S. and whether or not the participant was a U.S. citizen/resident was established. One theory about the public’s perception is that people would not necessarily change their

attitudes because of mass media, but they would rather “hold their tongues” out of fear of publicly opposing the perceived majority opinions.

The mass media has an impact on individual’s perception of society, even though evidence of attitude change mediated by perception is relatively weak (Mutz, 1994 as cited in Shibantai et al, 2001). Since mass media has great influence on the public’s perception (Shibantai, et al, 2001), the source where the subjects receive the majority of their news was sought after in the demographics section. The language in which the majority of news they receive is in was also requested because these variables may impact the pattern of responses to the perception and/or knowledge questions.

3.5 Limitations of the Research

One disadvantage the investigator did face because the survey instrument was mailed as opposed to personal face-to-face interviews or phone surveys was the low expectedly low response rates of non-English speaking subjects. The survey was directed towards English speaking adults who have at least minimum educational and literacy levels. The IATC’s population consists of a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual community with a large portion being part of a larger immigrant population who are not fluent in English. This, in effect, “eliminates many immigrant populations that form substantial...” population “in many areas ... and could lead to a biased sample” (Survey, 2005). Non-English speakers were underrepresented in this study.

Another disadvantage was the lack of feedback, comments, and follow-up questioning due to the nature of the survey instrument. The simplicity of the questions and answer choice did not permit the respondents to fully express their opinions

regarding the issues raised. According to Santiago (2005), this type of research creates “difficulty in drawing meaningful conclusions from the participant’s results.”

3.6 Measurement

The survey items measured on a Likert scale were coded to reflect their respective ordinal values. The response choices for each of the demographical items were coded to reflect their respective categorical and ordinal values. The respondent’s selections and answer choices taken from the survey instrument were coded and entered in SPSS. Frequencies were generated with regards to the number of responses from each variable. Having taken into consideration other studies of similar nature, the researcher determined these are standard procedures researchers follow when conducting this type of study.

Tables were configured using SPSS through variables defined by the researcher. The variables were recorded, saved, and then analyzed into a SPSS file. Given the nature of the study, statistical means for males and females were calculated and compared using a t-test comparison. The t-test comparison produced a p-value which was also recorded. The purpose of t-test comparisons is to determine whether or not a statistically significant difference exists between the means when comparing two variables.

T-test comparison outcomes with that produced a statistically significant difference between the responses of males and females were flagged and further explained in chapter four. P-values with a confidence level of 0.01 and/or 0.05 were indicated in the tables reproduced in chapter four using asterisks (* and **

respectively). Demographical information and the statistical means and t-test comparisons of each variable are fully explained and illustrated in chapter four.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the data collected from the Islamic Association of Tarrant County survey in 2006. The findings from the research are presented in eight tables and four figures. The findings will be divided into three main subsections: 1) demographical information, 2) perceptions of the War on Terrorism, and 3) knowledge of the War on Terrorism. The tables and figures serve as references for the information detailing the differences and similarities between males and females.

For the purpose of this study, descriptive statistics and frequencies were used in the analysis of the demographics variables. SPSS was used to analyze the information provided. Independent samples t-tests were also used to determine the differences, if any, between the male and female respondents. Variables that show a statistical difference at 0.05 and 0.01 levels will be specifically marked in the second and third sections. The significance of these differences, or lack of, will be further explained in the final chapter of this study.

As indicated in chapter 3, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement based on 3-point, 4-point, and 5-point Likert Scales. Respondents were asked to circle the appropriate number “1-3”, “1-4” or “1-5” to indicate their level of agreement. Respondents were also asked to respond to multiple choice questions by

circling one or more of the given responses. Some of the questions were in the yes and no format where respondents were asked to select one of the choices.

4.1 Demographical Information

This study involved a total of 75 respondents. The data revealed that almost all of the respondents identified as Muslim (99%) and non-Muslim (1%). The ages of the respondents varied along the different ranges: 18-27 (20%), ages 28-39 (23%), ages 40-54 (31%), ages 55-64 (24%), and ages 65+ (1%). The gender of the respondents was evenly divided between males (51%) and females (49%).

The ethnicity of the majority of the respondents was South Asian (28%) followed by black or African American (25%). Middle Easterners (Arab) (19%) and white or Caucasian (18%) were the third and fourth major responses respectively. The remaining categories were Asian or Pacific Islander (4%), “other” (3%), and (1%) each of the following: Hispanic or Latino; Middle Eastern (Arab) and Hispanic or Latino; white or Caucasian and “other”; and white or Caucasian and Middle Eastern (Non-Arab). None of the respondents were Middle-Eastern (non-Arab) alone.

More than three-fourths of all the participants had obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher. Most of the participants had obtained only a bachelor’s degree (49%). Other levels of education included doctorate or post-doctorate (18%), master’s degree (16%), high school (15%) and high school or less (3%). Contrary to what the researcher assumed, almost all of the respondents were U.S. citizens or residents. Ninety-seven percent (97%) of the respondents were U.S. citizens or residents and three percent (3%) were not with the majority of all respondents having lived in the U.S. for more than

eleven years (92%). Five percent (5%) lived in the U.S. between six and ten years, and three percent (3%) lived in the U.S. between one and five years. Table 4.1 outlines the respondent's complete demographical information as detailed in this section.

Table 4.1 Respondent Demographics

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Choices</i>	<i>Frequencies</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Muslim	Yes	71	99%
	No	1	1%
Age	18-27	15	20%
	28-39	17	23%
	40-54	23	31%
	55-64	18	24%
	65+	1	1%
Gender	Male	38	51%
	Female	36	49%
Ethnicity	South Asian	20	28%
	Black / African American	18	25%
	Middle Eastern (Arab)	14	19%
	White/Caucasian	13	18%
	Asian / Pacific Islander	3	4%
	Other	2	3%
	Hispanic / Latino	1	1%
	Middle Eastern (Arab) and Hispanic / Latino	1	1%
	White / Caucasian and Other	1	1%
	White / Caucasian and Middle Eastern (Non-Arab)	1	1%
	Middle Eastern (Non-Arab)	0	0%
Education	High school or less	2	3%
	High School	11	15%
	Bachelor's Degree	36	49%
	Master's Degree	12	16%
	Doctorate/Post-Doctorate	13	18%
Citizen/ Resident	Yes	72	97%

Table 4.1 – continued.

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Choices</i>	<i>Frequencies</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Citizen/ Resident	No	2	3%
# of years in the U.S.	Less than 1 year	0	0%
	1-5	2	3%
	6-10	4	5%
	11+	67	92%

It could be argued that the perceptions of people are heavily influenced by the outlets of news information they receive. Respondents were asked for their primary source of news information and the language they receive it in. Both of these demographical questions were in a multiple choice format where respondents were directed to select one or more of the choices provided. Due to the format of the questions, these responses were also divided using descriptive statistics instead of independent samples t-tests. They were relayed in this section using percentages instead of n-values in order to see how each response fared in proportion to the other choices.

For the primary source of news information, the respondents were requested to select one or more of the following choices: TV, internet, radio, newspaper, mosque, friends/family, or other. The leading source of new information for Muslims at IATC is TV with (25%) selecting this as an answer choice. The Internet (19%) was the second choice followed closely by the radio (17%) and newspaper (16%). Eleven percent (11%) of the respondents received their primary source of news from the Mosque while (8%) received it from friends and/or family. Only (4%) said they received news

primarily from another source that was not listed as one of the choices. Figure 4.1 illustrates the responses for the primary sources of news information.

The language in which the majority of news was received was asked to determine what different languages or ethnic/cultural media outlets the respondents were a part of. The overwhelming majority of respondents (78%) received the majority of the news in English. Arabic (13%) and Urdu (6%) were the other two languages respondents selected as the language in which they receive the majority of their news in. Three percent (3%) selected a language other than one listed as a choice.




Figure 4.1: Sources of News Information




Figure 4.2: Language of Primary News Source

4.2 Perceptions of the War on Terrorism

This section contains a variety of statements intended to measure and analyze the perceptions of the members of the Islamic Association of Tarrant County. The participants' perceptions of the Global War on Terrorism, issues regarding religion, and security concerns were asked about in the first part of this section. Fifteen statements were presented to determine whether or not there were any significant statistical differences between the perceptions of men and women at the 0.05 and the 0.01 levels.

Of the fifteen statements, Muslims were in general agreement with thirteen of the fifteen statements. Only two of the statements resulted in a significant statistical difference between men and women in their responses. The statement on whether “the manner in which the U.S. protects its *borders* is just and fair” resulted in a statistical mean of 3.31 for females and 2.71 for males. Their overall answers reflected either a

general sense of agreement or a sense of neutrality with the statements. The values resulted in a p-value of 0.002 which means that there was a high degree of disagreement between males and females with regards to how just and fair the manner in which the U.S. is protecting its borders.

The second statement was whether “the manner in which the U.S. protects its *citizens* is just and fair” instead of its *borders*. As in the case of the previous statement, the overall answers of Muslims reflected either a general sense of agreement or a sense of neutrality with the statements. This statement provided the same statistical means for females and males but led to a subsequent p-value of 0.003. Males and females subsequently differed in their opinions about whether the manner in which the U.S. protects its citizens. Both of these statements had a statistical significant difference at the 0.01 confidence level.

One statement along the same frameset to the previous two statements was “the manner in which the U.S. protects its *interests* is just and fair.” The sentiment Muslims had towards the way in which the U.S. protects its *interests* was a general sense of neutrality with a tilt towards disagreeing with the statement. The statistical means for females was 3.83 and for males 3.51 with a p-value of 0.225. There were less differences between the responses males and females offered with comparison to the previous two statements. This statement did not reach a true level of significance.

When asked whether they tried to adhere to the teachings of Islam in all aspects of their life, Muslims were almost unanimous in strong agreement with this statement. They also generally strongly agreed that the safety and security of the U.S., other

countries, and Muslims was important to them. Most Muslims were pretty familiar with the U.S. led War on Terrorism according to their general responses. Among both Muslim males and females, there was a general sense that the War on Terrorism does not deter terrorism within the U.S. and that the War on Terrorism is an appropriate response to terrorist threats overseas. Muslims in general neither agreed nor disagreed with the notion that the attackers of 9/11 had valid grievances against the U.S. Most of the respondents did not feel that the attackers were justified in their actions resulting in a unanimous disagreement with the notion. There was a strong sense of neutrality among Muslims that the War on Terrorism is a war of Christianity versus Islam. On the other hand, Muslims were in general disagreement that the War on Terrorism is a war of Islam versus Christianity.

When controlled for by gender, the following statements were found not to have any statistical significant differences between men and women were: “I strive to adhere to the teachings of Islam in all aspects of my life,” “the safety and/or security of the U.S. is important to me,” “the safety and/or security of other countries is important to me,” “the safety and/or security of Muslims is important to me,” “I am familiar with the U.S. led War on Terrorism,” “I feel the War on Terrorism deters terrorism within the U.S.,” “I feel the War on Terrorism is an appropriate response to terrorist threats overseas,” “I feel the attackers that participated in the events of 9/11 had valid grievances against the U.S.,” “I feel that the attackers that participated in the events of 9/11 were justified in their actions,” “I feel that the U.S. deserved the attacks of 9/11,” “the war on Terrorism is a war of Islam versus Christianity,” “and the war on Terrorism

is a war of Christianity versus Islam.” Table 4.2 represents the data collected with regards to the perceptions of War on Terrorism, religious issues, and security concerns.

Table 4.2: Perceptions on Religion, Security, and the War on Terrorism

	Female	Male	P-value
I strive to adhere to the teachings of Islam in all aspects of my life.	1.41	1.60	0.175
The safety and/or security of the U.S. is important to me.	1.06	1.21	0.058
The safety and/or security of other countries is important to me.	1.33	1.32	0.868
The safety and/or security of Muslims is important to me.	1.06	1.16	0.111
I am familiar with the U.S. led War on Terrorism.	1.67	1.73	0.723
The manner in which the U.S. protects its borders is just & fair.	3.31	2.71	0.002**
The manner in which the U.S. protects its interests is just & fair.	3.81	3.51	0.225
The manner in which the U.S. protects its citizens is just & fair.	3.31	2.99	0.003**
I feel the War on Terrorism deters terrorism within the U.S.	3.72	3.53	0.318
I feel the War on Terrorism is an appropriate response to terrorist threats overseas.	3.97	3.76	0.334
I feel the attackers that participated in the events of 9/11 had valid grievances against the U.S.	3.39	3.16	0.309
I feel that the attackers that participated in the events of 9/11 were justified in their actions.	4.28	4.37	0.598
Do you feel that the U.S. deserved the attacks of 9/11?	4.28	3.89	0.083
The war on Terrorism is a war of Islam versus Christianity.	3.53	3.39	0.540
The war on Terrorism is a war of Christianity versus Islam.	2.97	2.76	0.356

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level

** Statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level

Respondents were requested to indicate whether they felt an increase, decrease, or neutrality towards five statements regarding terrorism and exposure to Islam post 9/11. The only statement that resulted in any significant statistical difference between males and females was whether or not positive exposure to Islam has increased, decreased, or remained neutral. None of the respondents felt that positive exposure to Islam had decreased. Females responded with a statistical mean of 1.75 while males responded with a statistical mean of 2.18. The t-test comparison (p-value) for this variable was 0.009 concluding that there was a statistical significant difference at the 0.01 confidence level. Men and women significantly differed in their opinions about whether positive exposure to Islam had increased, decreased, or remained the same. More specifically, women generally felt there was an increase in positive exposure to Islam when compared to men.

Muslims generally felt an increased fear of being victimized by a terrorist attack since 9/11. Although Muslim generally felt the level of international terrorism has increased, they were rather neutral with regards to the level of terrorist activities in the U.S. since 9/11. Even though Muslim males and females were broadly split on the positive exposure to Islam since 9/11, there was a general sense of agreement among Muslims that the negative exposure to Islam had increased.

There were no significant differences between male and female respondents regarding whether they felt the likelihood of being victimized by a terrorist attack since 9/11 had increased, decreased or remained neutral. The same conclusion was found with regards to the levels of terrorist activities in the U.S. and the levels of international

terrorism. There were also no differences between male and female responses of whether negative exposure to Islam since 9/11 has increased, decreased, or remained neutral. Table 4.3 outlines the responses to the five statements measuring respondent's perceptions of terrorism and exposure to Islam since the 9/11 attacks.

Table 4.3: Perception of Respondent's "Since 9/11"

	Female	Male	P-value
Since 9/11, the likelihood of whether or not I will be victimized by a terrorist attack.	1.33	1.45	0.324
Since 9/11, the level of terrorist activities in the U.S.	1.97	2.08	0.386
Since 9/11, the level of international terrorism.	1.23	1.11	0.162
Since 9/11, the positive exposure to Islam. In the U.S.	1.75	2.18	0.009**
Since 9/11, negative exposure to Islam in the U.S.	1.23	1.29	0.464

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level

** Statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level

The next line of questioning was focused on whether the respondents felt because of their self-identification as Muslims; they felt they were the focus of the War on Terrorism. When asked about whether they felt Muslims were the focus of the War on Terrorism, 87% of the respondents answered in the affirmative, 12% answered negatively, and 1% did not answer the question. When further asked why Muslims were the focus of the War on Terrorism, 28% attributed this focus to bias in media reporting; 27% to misconceptions about the Islamic faith; 18% blamed this focus on the high number of conflicts taking place in predominantly Muslim countries; 13% felt there is a deficit in the American culture and another 13% blamed it on actual involvement in terrorist activities. Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4 indicate the responses of whether Muslims are the focus of the War on Terrorism and why.

Table 4.4: Are Muslims the Focus of the War on Terrorism?

I feel that Muslims are the Focus of the War on Terrorism	Yes		No		No Answer	
	87%	Frequency	12%	Frequency	1%	Frequency
		65		9		1




Figure 4.3: Reasons why Muslims are the Focus of the War on Terrorism

The next set of questions focused on who or what the War on Terrorism is against. Participants were asked to select one or more of the choices provided in a multiple choice format. The responses were presented using simple percentages in order to illustrate the perceptions of male and female respondents combined instead of males and females separately.

The majority of the participants in this study felt the religion of Islam was the primary target of the War on Terrorism. Twenty-two percent (22%) of the respondents were of this opinion. Twenty percent (20%) considered Muslims and not their religion

to be the main target. The third choice of who the War on Terrorism is against was Arabs with eighteen percent (18%) of the respondents selecting this choice. Extremists were the main targets of the War on Terrorism according to fifteen percent (15%) of the respondents and terrorists were the main targets according to thirteen percent 13%. Foreigners (8%) and “others” (4%) were the final selections of who or what the War on Terrorism is against. See figure 4.4 for a full illustration.




Figure 4.4: Who or What is the War on Terrorism Against?

The following set of nine statements focused on the respondent's perceptions of whether or not they felt singled out or targeted because of their faith. The statements also were worded in such a fashion as to determine if the respondents felt there was a relationship between the religion of Islam and violence. Muslims were not in agreement about their feelings of being accused of terrorist activities because of their faith. For the most part, they felt they were at greater risk of being accused or at least neutral about it. The respondents were not uniform in their responses about whether other members of the Muslim community felt at risk of being accused of terrorist activities because of their faith. While the majority of Muslims were in agreement that other members of the Muslim community do feel at risk of being accused, their level of agreement differed significantly when controlled for their gender.

The results of four out of the nine statements resulted in a significant statistical differences between the perceptions of males and females. The first statement of significance suggests that females (2.89) and males (2.18; $p=0.001$) feel at risk of being accused of terrorist activities because of their faith. The second statement of significance suggests that females (2.44) and males (1.89; $p=0.001$) felt that others in their community feel at risk of being accused of terrorist activities because of their faith. Both these statements are statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence levels. Lines one and two of table 4.5 illustrate this response.

Of the second group of statements in lines three and four, only one of the statements had any statistical significance. Muslim males and females generally felt under more scrutiny by law enforcement officials and authorities because of their faith.

When asked to indicate the level of agreement, the statement produced a level of significance between females (2.56) and males (2.16; p-value=0.024). This was significant at the 0.05 confidence level. When asked about their feelings regarding the American public, there was a greater sense of unity among Muslims in their feelings of more scrutiny. The statement if the individuals felt under more scrutiny by the American public because of their faith did not carry any significance between females (2.08) and males (2.32; p-value=0.161).

Muslims generally agreed at different levels that the War on Terrorism disproportionately targets Muslims living both in the U.S. and outside of the U.S. In other words, Muslim males and females had a similar feeling towards this issue. Not surprisingly, both Muslim males and females strongly disagreed that Islam is a religion that advocates violence. They also disagreed that the concept of Jihad in Islam supports the use of violence as a means to an end.

When specifying for gender, the following statements did not have any statistical differences between men and women: the War on Terrorism disproportionately targets Muslims living in the U.S., females (2.08) and males (1.87; p-value=0.158); the War on Terrorism disproportionately targets Muslims living outside of the U.S., females (1.86) and males (1.76; p-value=0.488); Islam is a religion that advocates violence, females (4.89) and males (4.82; p-value=0.252); and the concept of Jihad in Islam supports the use of violence as means to an end, females (4.42) and males (4.29; p-value=0.419).

Muslims generally agreed that the religion of Islam is misinterpreted. Muslim males and females differed significantly as to what degree they agreed with this statement. The final statement of significance suggests that females (1.86) and males (1.42; p-value=0.019) perceive Islam as a religion that is misinterpreted to advocate violence. The confidence level of significance is at the 0.05 level. The details of these results are reiterated in table 4.2. These questions about the profiling of Muslims and the role Islam plays with regards to violence were intended to determine whether or not Muslims felt a negative reaction by others.

Table 4.5: Perceptions of Profiling and Islam

	Female	Male	P-value
I feel at risk of being accused of terrorist activities because of my faith.	2.89	2.18	0.001**
Others in my community feel at risk of being accused of terrorism because of their faith.	2.44	1.89	0.001**
I feel under more scrutiny by law enforcement officials & authorities because of my faith.	2.56	2.16	0.024*
I feel under more scrutiny by the American public because of my faith.	2.08	2.32	0.161
The War on Terrorism disproportionately targets Muslims living in the U.S.	2.08	1.87	0.158
The War on Terrorism disproportionately targets Muslims living outside of the U.S.	1.86	1.76	0.488
Islam is a religion that advocates violence.	4.89	4.82	0.252
The concept of Jihad in Islam supports the use of violence as means to an end.	4.42	4.29	0.419
Islam is misinterpreted as a religion that advocates violence.	1.86	1.42	0.019*

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level

** Statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level

The respondents had mixed feelings about future terrorist attacks and their timings. Although there was a general sense of neutrality leaning towards disagreement with the statements, a generalization cannot be deducted. As indicated in table 4.6, a statistically significant difference was detected between males (3.97) and females (3.29; $p\text{-value}=0.000$) about whether a major terrorist attack will occur that is greater in magnitude than 9/11 within 12-24 months. Along the same lines, a statistically significant difference was detected between males (3.00) and females (3.51; $p\text{-value}=0.003$) about whether the U.S. is likely to be the target of a major terrorist attack within 12-24 months. Both of these statements resulted in a confidence level at the 0.01 level.

The respondents also had mixed feelings about whether the War on Terrorism effectively reduced terrorism outside of the U.S. Although Muslims generally disagreed that the War on Terrorism effectively reduced terrorism outside of the U.S., there was a statistically significant difference between males and females regarding their level of disagreement. Males disagreed stronger (4.41) than females (4.11; $p\text{-value}=0.024$) that the War on Terrorism effectively reduced terrorism outside the U.S. at the 0.05 confidence level. Along a similar line of questioning about whether the War on Terrorism effectively reduced terrorism within the U.S., Muslims were more uniform in their responses. Although Muslims were in general disagreement with this statement, there were no statistical significant differences at the 0.01 nor the 0.05 levels between the males (3.61) and females (3.97; $p\text{-value}=0.059$) regarding this issue.

The remaining statements did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the male and female respondents either. When asked to indicate the level of agreement with whether the War on Terrorism will curtail future terrorist attacks, the mean value for males was 3.68 and the mean value for females was 3.86; p-value=0.436. Males had a mean value of 3.06 and females had a mean value of 3.32 when responding to the statement about whether a major terrorist attack was imminent within 12-24 months. The respondents were generally either neutral or slightly disagreeing with these statements.

The respondents were probed to find out their opinions about other people living in predominantly Muslim countries. When asked if people from predominantly Muslim countries felt the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism within and outside of the U.S., the respondents were generally disagreed. These two sections did not reveal any significant differences between males and females giving us the assumption that they were pretty similar in their responses. When comparing males and females with a t-test comparison about whether people from predominantly Muslim countries believe the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism *within* the U.S., males had a mean value of 3.94 and females 3.73; p-value=0.217. For the statement, people from predominantly Muslim countries believe the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism *outside* the U.S., males had a mean value of 4.23 and females had a mean value of 4.00; p-value 0.159. Once again, neither of these last two statements resulted in any level of statistical significance. Table 4.6 outlines the statements, the mean values for females, the mean values for males, and the corresponding p-values.

Table 4.6: The Effectiveness and Successfulness of the War on Terrorism

	Female	Male	P-value
The War on Terrorism will curtail future terrorist attacks.	3.86	3.68	0.436
The War on Terrorism effectively reduces terrorism within the U.S.	3.97	3.61	0.059
The War on Terrorism effectively reduces terrorism outside of the U.S.	4.11	4.41	0.024*
A major terrorist attack is imminent within the 12-24 months.	3.06	3.32	0.146
A major terrorist attack will occur that is greater in magnitude than 9/11 within the 12-24 months.	3.29	3.97	0.000**
The U.S. is likely to be the target of a major terrorist attack within the 12-24 months.	3.00	3.51	0.003**
People from predominantly Muslim countries believe the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism within the U.S.	3.94	3.73	0.217
People from predominantly Muslim countries believe the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism outside the U.S.	4.23	4.00	0.159

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level

** Statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level

4.3 Knowledge of the War on Terrorism

This last section of the findings chapter was intended to uncover the respondent's knowledge had about the War on Terrorism. There were eleven variables aimed at measuring the opinions of Muslims with regards to their general knowledge of the War on Terrorism. Generalizations cannot be made about whether Muslims personally knew someone who has been wrongfully treated by the U.S. government during the War on Terrorism. Males had a tendency to agree more with this statement than females. There was also a sense of disagreement among Muslims about whether International rules apply to the War on Terrorism. Muslims generally felt the War on

Terrorism was not a war in which International rules apply. Was the U.S. invasion of Iraq a component of the War on Terrorism? Muslims were either generally neutral (females) or they were in disagreement (males). When asked the same question about the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Muslims felt the opposite. For the most part, females strongly agreed that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was a component of the War on Terrorism while males agreed but at a lower level.

Statistical analysis revealed males and females differed significantly for the preceding four questions. The first variable that indicated any statistical significance was “I personally know someone who has been wrongfully treated by the U.S. government during the War on Terrorism.” The mean value for males was 3.11 and the mean value for females was 2.49 with a t-test comparison of 0.002. The mean values indicated that females had a significantly different level of agreement with the statement than males about personally knowing someone who has been wrongfully treated by the U.S. government during the War on Terrorism. For the variable, “the War on Terrorism is a war in which the International rules of war apply,” the t-test comparison (p-value) is 0.022 and the statistical mean values are 4.23 for males and 3.76 for females. The mean values indicated that males and females who participated are in disagreement on whether international rules apply to the War on Terrorism at the 0.05 confidence level.

The variables concerning whether the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were components of the War on Terrorism were the final two statements in this section that carried any statistical differences. When asked to indicate their level of agreement with whether or not “the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a component of the War on Terrorism,”

males had a mean value of 4.05 while females had a mean value of 3.15. The t-test comparison resulted in a p-value of 0.000. This p-value indicates that males and females disagreed on whether the invasion of Iraq was a component of the War on Terrorism.

When asked to indicate their level of agreement with whether or not “the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was a component of the War on Terrorism,” males had a mean value of 2.89 while females had a mean value of 1.33; p-value=0.026. Again, the results show that there was a significant difference between how males and females felt regarding the association between the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. Although the differences were significant, the responses were less different than in their responses towards Iraq.

There was a general sense of agreement among the respondents that “the War on Terrorism was created as a direct result of 9/11.” Line two of table 4.7 reflects the females’ means of 2.60 and males’ mean of 2.89 producing a p-value of 0.240. There was a strong sense of agreement among all the respondents with the statement: “the U.S. intended to initiate the War on Terrorism prior to 9/11.” This variable displayed a mean value of 2.54 for females and 2.38 for males. The t-test comparison or p-value for this variable was 0.404 meaning that there were no statistically significant differences.

Muslims generally agreed that “the War on Terrorism is part of the Bush's Conservative political agenda.” When controlling for gender, this variable lacked any statistically significant differences between males and females. This variable exhibited a t-test comparison of 0.164, with 1.62 statistical mean for males and 1.83 statistical

mean for females. These values indicate there is a relatively high sense of agreement with this statement.

When asked to indicate whether the War on Terrorism was successful at identifying individuals, states, and/or organizations, Muslims generally disagreed that the War on Terrorism was successful. Put in a different way, Muslims generally felt the War on Terrorism was *not* successful at identifying individuals, states, and/or organizations supporting terrorism.

In all three instances, statistically significant differences between the responses of males and females were absent. For the specific variable about the War on Terrorism identifying individual terrorists, the t-test comparison displayed a p-value of 0.614. The statistical mean for males was 3.43 and the statistical mean for females was 3.53. There was a general sense of disagreement with this statement.

The variable, “to the extent that I am aware of, the War on Terrorism has been successful at identifying organizations supporting terrorism” yielded a p-value of 0.125. There were also less differences between males (mean=3.16) and females (mean=3.47) about the identification of organizations supporting terrorism.

The third variable in this group was about the successfulness of the War on Terrorism at identifying states supporting terrorism. Males had a statistical mean of 3.73 and females had a statistical mean of 3.83 producing a p-value of 0.573. As in the case of individual terrorists, respondents were in general agreement about the unsuccessfulness of the War on Terrorism at identifying states that support terrorism.

Finally, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with

whether “a timeline exists for the War on Terrorism.” Again, Muslims generally disagreed that a timeline existed for the War on Terrorism. Although males (p-value=3,77) agreed more with this statement than females (p-value=4.09) did, the differences were not significant. The results indicated a t-test comparison of 0.130. For a list of all statements, t-test comparisons, and means involving the general knowledge of the War on Terrorism, refer to table 4.7.

Table 4.7: General Knowledge of the War on Terrorism

	Female	Male	P-value
I personally know someone who has been wrongfully treated by the U.S. government during the War on Terrorism.	3.11	2.49	0.002**
The War on Terrorism was created as a direct result of 9/11.	2.60	2.89	0.240
The U.S. intended to initiate the War on Terrorism prior to 9/11.	2.54	2.38	0.404
The War on Terrorism is part of the Bush's Conservative political agenda.	1.83	1.62	0.164
To the extent that I am aware of, the War on Terrorism has been successful at identifying individual terrorists.	3.53	3.43	0.614
To the extent that I am aware of, the War on Terrorism has been successful at identifying organizations supporting terrorism.	3.47	3.16	0.125
To the extent that I am aware of, the War on Terrorism has been successful at identifying states supporting terrorism.	3.83	3.73	0.573
The War on Terrorism is a war in which the International rules of war apply.	4.23	3.76	0.022*
A timeline exists for the War on Terrorism.	4.09	3.77	0.130
The U.S. invasion of Iraq was a component of the War on Terrorism.	3.15	4.05	0.000**
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was a component of the War on Terrorism.	1.33	2.89	0.026*

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level

** Statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level

This following section used rating scales to determine the respondents' knowledge of the War on Terrorism. The responses were primarily focused between having good to fair knowledge of each of the following issues regarding the War on Terrorism: 1) the origin, 2) the leadership, 3) the organizational structure, 4) the goals, and 5) the legal modifications made in U.S. laws as a result of the War on Terrorism. Muslims generally claimed to have between good to fair knowledge of each of these subjects.

Of these five variables used in measuring respondent's knowledge of the War on Terrorism, none of the variables produced statistically significant differences between males and females when compared using t-test comparisons. When asked "how would you rate your knowledge of the origin of the War on Terrorism," the mean response for females was 2.17 while males yielded a mean response of 2.27. The p-value for this comparison was 0.488 meaning there was a general sense of agreement among males and females about their level of knowledge on the origin of the War on Terrorism.

The variable, "How would you rate your knowledge of the leadership of the War on Terrorism" offered a p-value of 0.864 with a 2.43 mean for females and a 2.41 mean for males. The t-test comparison resulted for this variable resulted in presumably high level of agreement about respondents having good to fair knowledge of the leadership of the War on Terrorism.

Next, the variable "how would you rate your knowledge of the organizational structure of the War on Terrorism" displayed a statistical mean of 2.66 for females and

2.65 for males. These means reflected a p-value of 0.939. Again, the t-test comparison resulted in a presumably high sense of agreement among respondents about their knowledge of the organizational structure of the War on Terrorism. The p-value from this variable is higher than any other p-value on this survey instrument meaning that males and females had the least differences in their response to this statement when compared to any of the other statements offered.

When asked to rate their knowledge of the goals of the War on Terrorism, males yielded a statistical mean of 2.59 while females yielded a statistical mean of 2.37. The p-value for this variable was 0.229 which subsequently lacks any statistical significant differences between the responses of males and females.

Finally, the variable “how would you rate your knowledge of legal modification made in U.S. laws as a result of the War on Terrorism?” yielded a p-value of 0.488. The female respondents’ mean was 2.54 and the male respondent’s mean was 2.46, thus indicating a strong sense of general agreement. Table 4.8 reflects the statistical means for both males and females along with their corresponding p-values for each of the five variables.

Table 4.8: Rating Scales of Respondent’s Knowledge of the War on Terrorism

	Female	Male	P-value
How would you rate your knowledge of the origin of the War on Terrorism?	2.17	2.27	0.488
How would you rate your knowledge of the leadership of the War on Terrorism?	2.43	2.41	0.864
How would you rate your knowledge of the organizational structure of the War on Terrorism?	2.66	2.65	0.939

Table 4.8 – continued.

	Female	Male	P-value
How would you rate your knowledge of the goals of the War on Terrorism?	2.37	2.59	0.229
How would you rate your knowledge of legal modification made in U.S. laws as a result of the War on Terrorism?	2.54	2.46	0.562

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level

** Statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The intention of this study was to gather the data needed in order to assess the perceptions and knowledge of Muslim Americans regarding the U.S. led War on Terrorism. Chapter four revealed the findings of the study along with tables and figures illustrating the results. Some of the statements in this study uncovered statistically significant differences among males and females in the Muslim American community while other statements did not. In the chapter, the author will briefly discuss the findings of this research, suggest future policy implications, and encourage the need for further research on this same area of study.

5.1 Discussion on Findings

Muslims that participated in this study almost unanimously agreed that they adhere to the teachings of Islam in all aspects of their life. The safety and security of the U.S., other countries, and Muslims was very important to the respondents. Most respondents were pretty familiar with the U.S. led War on Terrorism and they felt it does not deter terrorism within the U.S. nor is it an appropriate response to terrorist threats overseas. Muslims were rather neutral in their feelings that the attackers of 9/11 had valid grievances against the U.S. Most of the respondents did not feel that the attackers were justified in their actions resulting in a unanimous disagreement with the

notion. Muslims also were pretty neutral in their response to whether the War on Terrorism is a war of Christianity versus Islam. On the other hand, they disagreed that the War on Terrorism is a war of Islam versus Christianity.

Since 9/11, Muslims had an increased fear of being victimized by a terrorist attack. Negative exposure to Islam had also increased. More than three-fourths of the respondents felt Muslims were the focus of the War on Terrorism primarily because of bias in media reporting and misconceptions about the Islamic faith. Muslims felt the religion of Islam is misinterpreted by the others. Many Muslims that participated in this study also felt the religion of Islam was the primary target of the War on Terrorism. They felt the War on Terrorism disproportionately targets Muslims living both in the U.S. and outside of the U.S.

Muslims generally felt the War on Terrorism was not a war in which International rules apply. Although they generally considered the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to be a part of the War on Terrorism, Muslims did feel the same for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. They felt the level of international terrorism had increased rather than decreased since 9/11.

The findings for Muslim males and females showed a lack of statistically significant differences for the majority of the questions. There were some instances where statistically significant differences and these differences will be the focus of this section. Muslim females felt more strongly that the U.S. is not doing enough to protect its border and its citizens while the males were slightly more accepting. Perhaps

Muslim females are more rigid in their interpretation of what is “just and fair” when compared to males.

Muslim females also felt more strongly that the “the level of terrorist activities in the U.S.” has increased since the September 11th attacks compared to males. There was a statistically significant difference between how females and males felt about this issue. Again, these findings may imply that females have higher standards of what it means for the policies in place regarding the prevention of terrorism and the protection of citizens to be successful.

The findings revealed that females felt more at risk of being accused of terrorist activities because of their faith compared to males. Compared to males, females also felt more strongly that others in their community felt at risk as well. The significant differences imply again that females are more suspicious of possible discrimination because of their religion. Although both males and females felt the religion of Islam is widely misinterpreted as a religion that advocates violence, males felt stronger about this.

The findings also demonstrated that females felt there is a larger chance that “a major terrorist attack will occur that is greater in magnitude than 9/11 within the next 12-24 months” and that the “U.S. is likely to be the target.” Females also felt that the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were both components of the War on Terrorism significantly more than men did. Males seem to be more accepting of how the War on Terrorism is working or more conducive to the popular culture of accepting what the government does in the name of anti-terrorism. This conclusion may be surprising

considering males stated at a statistically higher level that they “personally knew someone who has been wrongfully treated by the U.S. government during the War on Terrorism.” In any effect, both males and females appear skeptical about the way in which the War on Terrorism is being conducted.

Almost all of the respondents, both male and female, felt that Muslims were the focus of the War on Terrorism. Only thirteen percent (13%) felt that Muslims were either not the primary focus or they did not answer the question. Respondents specifically reported that the War on Terrorism targets Islam as a religion and Muslims as a people. President Bush has repeatedly made public statements claiming that the War on Terrorism is not a war against Muslims nor is it a war against the religion of Islam. The perceptions of Muslim Americans in this study are clearly contrary to President Bush’s statements.

5.2 Policy Implications

This study implies that gender does not play a role in determining whether there are differences among Muslim Americans with respect to their attitudes towards the War on Terrorism. Although the majority of comparisons revealed no significant differences between males and females, the few that did yield statistical differences are noteworthy to mention. The relatively lack of differences between men and women implies that the Muslim community is leaning towards a united front when questioned about security concerns, religious issues, and the impact U.S. policies have that specifically effects Muslims.

One may argue that Muslim males and females differ in their approval of U.S. policies in place to protect different aspects of the country. As demonstrated in the review of the literature, the research lacks any useful information regarding the differences among males and females with respect to their attitudes and perceptions of the War on Terrorism. This is true for studies conducted on Muslims and non-Muslim Americans alike. Again, since the research is extremely limited regarding gender differences during the post 9/11 era, these findings imply that females are more sensitive towards issues of security, terrorism, and religion than men.

One may also argue that Muslims feel targeted by the War on Terrorism. These feelings may indirectly be interpreted as Muslims feeling discriminated against by government policies or as Muslims feeling profiled because of their religion. These feelings could create an atmosphere of resentment, hostility, and anger towards people outside the Muslim community. In order to minimize these feelings and reduce the slight possibility of discrimination against a people because of their religion and not because of their actions, programs and/or efforts can be put forward to work against this perception.

Since the majority of Muslim felt they are the focus of the War on Terrorism because of media bias and misconceptions about their faith, these two areas could be the main areas targeted for improvement. Other reasons included conflicts in predominately Muslim countries, a deficit in the American culture, and actual involvement of self-identified Muslims in terrorist activities. Educational programs or services could be created to improve quality of media reporting at least for the major

U.S. media outlets. These programs and services may also be conducted in order to educate the non-Muslim American public, including the media, about the Islamic faith.

5.3 Future Research

The author is hopeful that this study has provoked interest among the academic community about Muslim Americans with regards to their attitudes and feelings about the War on Terrorism. The author is also hopeful that this study shed some insight about the gender differences or similarities of Muslim Americans. The author's intention is to seek the attention of members of the security communities including people whose responsibility it is to protect the American people – mainly the U.S. government. Future research on both the academic and security levels are necessary in order to obtain results that are applicable to all Muslim Americans. Generalizability to all Muslim Americans is limited due to the sample size and geographical location. Other factors may also effect the generalization of this study to all Muslims Americans including cultural, racial, and political factors.

When taking the findings and limitations of this study into consideration, the author recommends that further research on this topic include a broader sample population among Muslim Americans in the U.S. This may be done by sampling the Muslim communities in multiple U.S. cities on a much grander scale. Researchers may consider replicating this study to measure the perceptions and knowledge Muslims have towards the War on terrorism in languages other than English. For example, if the survey instrument is translated into Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi, results of the research may be more encompassing to include Muslim Americans whose primary language is not

English. Once the Muslim American population has been exhausted, the author recommends to further enhance the scope and magnitude of this research by extending it to international communities. This will provide more reliable information on a greater scale.

The author also recommends that future research examines differences with regards to the race, ethnicity, and educational levels of Muslim Americans and subsequently Muslims living in different countries, instead of gender. By using other variables to determine if there are differences among the perceptions and knowledge Muslims have towards the War on Terrorism, one is in effect investigating if culture or level of education serve as influencing factors.

This author's primary goals are to inform and educate the American public about how Muslim Americans feel towards sensitive issues regarding their religion, the War on Terrorism, and their own identity. This author's alternative goals are to inform and educate the broader international public about how Muslims around the world feel towards sensitive issues regarding their religion, the War on Terrorism, and their own identity. Through information and education, the author wishes to bridge the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Once the platform for communication and dialogue between these two groups is established, the author wishes for a productive exchange of combined ideas on how to tackle the issues of terrorism, violence, and war that is negatively effecting all parties involved.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY

Mariam Kazemi Masters Degree survey
of Muslims' perceptions of
the United State's War on Terrorism

This study is being conducted through the UTA Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology. This research does not have any affiliation to any organization. This study is aimed at measuring the perceptions that American Muslims have of the U.S. criminal justice system. This survey is absolutely voluntary and will be kept completely anonymous. No person is required to complete this survey and may terminate it at any point before its completion. The goal of this survey is to determine how American Muslims in the Fort Worth area perceive the U.S. criminal justice system. It is hopeful that the information gathered will be a valuable resource to the academic body of knowledge about this topic. It is also hopeful that this information will provide a sample of how American Muslims feel on different issues.

PARTICIPANT CONSENT

1. I verify that I am above the age of 18. If not, please do not complete the survey.
2. I understand that my participation in this research is completely voluntary.
3. I understand that I may stop participating in the survey at any time and doing so will not result in a penalty of any kind.
4. I understand that my personal identity will not be revealed and my responses will remain confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE SURVEY

Please answer each question by circling your answer choice, marking the appropriate box, and/or by printing the requested information in the spaces provided.

- *Please complete the survey and return it to: Mariam Kazemi
901 Patrick Lane #1127
Fort Worth, TX 76120*

- You may also drop it in specially marked boxes outside of the men's and women's prayer hall at the Islamic Association of Tarrant County before or after the Friday prayers.

1. I am Muslim. 1 Yes 2 No

2. I strive to adhere to the teachings of Islam in all aspects of my life.
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 *Strongly Disagree*

Your Perceptions of The War on Terrorism

3. Please select a choice for the following statements:

- | | strongly
agree | agree | neutral
disagree | strongly
disagree |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| a. <u>The safety and/or security of the U.S. is important to me</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. <u>The safety and/or security of other countries is important to me</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. <u>The safety and/or security of Muslims is important to me</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. <u>I am familiar with the U.S. led War on Terrorism</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. <u>The manner in which the U.S. protects its borders is just & fair</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| f. <u>The manner in which the U.S. protects its interests is just & fair</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| g. <u>The manner in which the U.S. protects its citizens is just & fair</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| h. <u>I feel the War on Terrorism deters terrorism within the U.S.</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| i. <u>I feel the War on Terrorism is an appropriate response to terrorist threats overseas</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| j. <u>I feel the attackers that participated in the events of 9/11 had valid grievances against the U.S.</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| k. <u>I feel that the attackers that participated in the events of 9/11 were justified in their actions</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| l. <u>Do you feel that the U.S. deserved the attacks of 9/11 (i.e. "they had it coming...")?</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| m. <u>The war on Terrorism is a war of Islam versus Christianity</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| n. <u>The war on Terrorism is a war of Christianity versus Islam</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |

4. Please rate the following about your *perception* of terrorism:

- | | Increased | neutral | decreased |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| a. <u>Since 9/11, the likelihood of being victimized by a terrorist attack has</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. <u>Since 9/11, terrorist activities in the U.S. have</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. <u>Since 9/11, international terrorism has</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. <u>Since the 9/11 attacks, positive exposure to Islam in the U.S. has</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. <u>Since the 9/11 attacks, negative exposure to Islam in the U.S. has</u> | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |

5. I feel that the War on Terrorism is a war against (*please check all that apply*):

- Islam
 Arabs
 Muslims
 Foreigners
 Terrorists
 Extremists
 Other

- | | strongly
agree | agree | neutral | disagree | strongly
disagree |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| c. The War on Terrorism effectively reduces terrorism outside of the U.S. | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. A major terrorist attack is imminent within the 12-24 months | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. A major terrorist attack will occur that is greater in magnitude than 9/11 within the 12-24 months | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| f. The U.S. is likely to be the target of a major terrorist attack within the 12-24 months | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| g. People from predominantly Muslim countries believe the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism within the U.S. | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| h. People from predominantly Muslim countries believe the War on Terrorism effectively deters terrorism outside the U.S. | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |

Your Knowledge of The War on Terrorism

9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statements about the War on Terrorism?

- | | strongly
disagree | disagree | strongly
agree | agree | neutral |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| a. I personally know someone who has been wrongfully treated by the U.S. government during the War on Terrorism | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. The War on Terrorism was created as a direct result of 9/11 | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. The U.S. intended to initiate the War on Terrorism prior to 9/11 | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d. The War on Terrorism is part of the Bush's Conservative political agenda | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e. To the extent that I am aware of, the War on Terrorism has been successful at identifying individual terrorists | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| f. To the extent that I am aware of, the War on | | | | | |

Terrorism has been successful at identifying
organizations supporting terrorism 1 2 3 4 5

g. To the extent that I am aware of, the War on
 Terrorism has been successful at identifying
states supporting terrorism 1 2 3 4 5

h. The War on Terrorism is a war in which
 the International rules of war apply 1 2 3 4 5

i. A timelines exists for the War on Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5

j. The U.S. invasion of **Iraq** was a component
 of the War on Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5

k. The U.S. invasion of **Afghanistan** was a
 component of the War on Terrorism 1 2 3 4 5

10. How would you rate your knowledge of:	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
a. The origin of the War on Terrorism	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. The leadership in the War on Terrorism	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
c. The organizational structure of the War on Terrorism	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
d. The goals of the War on Terrorism	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
e. Legal modifications made in U.S. laws as a result of the War on Terrorism	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>

Please complete the following sentences by circling one or more of the choices below:

11. The War on Terrorism is part of:
- The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
 - The Department of Justice (DOJ)
 - The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
 - The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
 - The U.S. Supreme Court
 - Other, please specify: _____

12. The War on Terrorism is:
- A specific time under heightened terror alert
 - Propaganda that the Bush administration is trying to spread
 - An actual war with real enemies and defendants
 - A vague term used to describe a new era of civilization
 - One aspect of the greater effort by the U.S. to thwart terrorism
 - Other, please specify: _____

13. The War on Terrorism should specifically address:
- The Palestinian/Israeli Crisis

- b. Countries developing their nuclear technology
- c. Terrorists not posing a direct threat to the U.S.
- d. Conflicts within a sovereign country (for example: civil wars)
- e. Muslim Radicals
- f. Separatist movements
- g. Domestic Terrorism (Terrorist activities occurring within the U.S.)
- h. Other, please specify: _____

General Information About You

14. My highest level of education completed is:

- High School or less High School Bachelor's Degree
 Masters Degree Doctorate/Post-Doctorate

15. I am a U.S. citizen/resident?

- Yes No

16. I have lived in the U.S. for:

- Less than 1 year 1 - 5 years 6 - 10 years 11+ years

17. At the time of this survey, I am:

- 18 - 27 years 28 - 39 years 40 - 56 years
 55 - 64 years 65 + years

18. My gender is:

- Female Male

19. My ethnicity is:

- White / Caucasian Hispanic / Latino
 Middle Eastern (Arab) Asian or Pacific Islander
 Middle Eastern (Non-Arab) South Asian (i.e. Indian Sub-continent)
 Black or African American Other (*specify*) _____

20. I receive the majority of news from the following sources (*please check all that apply*):

- TV Radio Other (*specify*) _____
 Internet Mosque
 Friends/Family Newspaper

21. The language I receive the majority of my news is (*please check all that apply*):

- English Arabic Urdu Other (*specify*) _____

I would like to personally THANK YOU for the time and efforts you spent on completing this survey. I appreciate your assistance in completing this research. MARIAM KAZEMI

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTALS

References for:

Table 2.1 A brief timeline of important events in the history of Islam in America

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